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ABSTRACT	
  
This study investigates the socio-political characteristics of the Egyptian political
satire show, Albernameg’s audience, as well as whether the audience considers the
show a source of news. This is studied in relation to the effects of the show on its
viewers’ perceptions of current issues. The uses and gratifications approach and the
framing theory are used as a theoretical framework. Qualitative content analysis
resulted in choosing perceptions of two issues: the AIDS & virus C detection device,
and coal introduction as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt, as the
media frames that were used as a basis for the survey questions. The qualitative
content analysis revealed that the two issues were framed negatively on Albernameg.
The survey findings show that Albernameg audience is politically interested and
attentive, exhibits low internal political efficacy and slightly high levels of external
political efficacy, with levels of political knowledge ranging between medium and
high. More than 50% of the sample considers Albernameg a source of news. The
results suggest the presence of framing effects in relation to the two issues under
consideration. Heavy viewers exhibit more negative perceptions of both issues.
Viewers who watched the show for information and those who watched for
entertainment both have negative perceptions of the two issues. There is an inverse
correlation between perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef and viewers’
perceptions of both issues. The higher the level of political knowledge, the more
negative the perceptions of the two issues. More politically knowledgeable viewers
are also slightly more likely to perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of
information than less politically knowledgeable ones. These results pose political
satire, and more specifically Albernameg, as a media literacy platform and a strong
tool for influencing public opinion.
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CHAPTER	
  ONE	
  
INTRODUCTION	
  
“Jesters do oft prove prophets”
William Shakespeare
King Lear (Act 5, Scene 3)
During Medieval times, kings kept jesters for amusement and telling jokes.
Jesters played the role of both entertainers and advisers, sarcastically mocking reality
to entertain and amuse. The jester’s unique position in the court allowed him to tell
the king the truth upfront that no one else dared to speak, under the cover of telling it
as a jest (Glenn, 2011). In this sense, contemporary political satire has given birth to
many modern-day jesters, one of the most famous worldwide being Jon Stewart, and
on a more local scale but also gaining widespread popularity, Bassem Youssef.
Political satire is a global genre. It dates back to the 1960s, originating in
Britain, and has now become transnational, with cross-cultural flows of the format
popular and flourishing across various countries (Baym & Jones, 2012). The Daily
Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report are examples of popular political
satire shows in the United States. Both shows have won Emmy awards and Jon
Stewart was named one of Time magazine’s 100 most influential people in the world.
Research on political satire shows that it does not have unified effects on its
audiences. Different types of satire lead to distinct influences on viewers
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Holbert et al, 2013; Lee,
2013). Moreover, viewers of different comedy shows are not homogeneous in nature.
The Daily Show's audience was found to be more politically interested and
knowledgeable than Leno and Letterman viewers (Young & Tisinger, 2006). Even
with exposure to the same show, different audience characteristics, such as varying
ages, political affiliations and levels of political knowledge, may result in varying
effects on viewers (Young, 2004; Young & Tisinger, 2006; Lee, 2013).
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In Egypt, political satire was present in the media arena with Mohamed Azab,
an Egyptian comedian, launching his program The Azab Show in 2010, mocking the
Egyptian government and Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif’s cabinet, but the program
was banned until the 25 January 2011 revolution. TV presenter, Akram Hosni, also
started a satirical program in which he created a character called Sayed Abu Hafiza, a
news presenter reporting the news in a comedic way and mocking famous figures
(ElGabry, 2014; Younis, 2014). The genre, however, really started flourishing with
Bassem Youssef’s show “Albernameg”, which literally translates into “The Show”.
Bassem Youssef is a cardiac surgeon. He started his satire show on YouTube in 2011,
going from there to a TV show on several satellite channels, beginning with ONTV,
moving to CBC and finally MBC. In 2013, Youssef was crowned “Man of the Year”
at the Esquire Middle East Awards (“Bassem Youssef: Egypt’s freedom-of-speech
icon”), was chosen by Foreign Policy magazine among its global thinkers (“Bassem
Youssef, Heba Morayef and Hossam Bahget among 2013 FP global thinkers”) and
was Google’s top trending search for people in Egypt (Aggour, 2014). He was also
one of four journalists presented with the 2013 International Press Freedom Awards
by The Committee to Protect Journalists (Astor, 2014).	
  	
  Moreover,	
  Albernameg was
the most searched TV show on Google (Aggour, 2013) and the top trending Arabic
talk show on YouTube (“Videos: YouTube reveals top Middle East videos”).
Bassem Youssef and his show have reached over 2 million followers on Twitter and 6
million fans on Facebook.
Throughout its operation, Bassem Youssef’s show has been a matter of strong
debate and controversy, being sometimes hailed for revealing inconsistencies and
hypocrisies in the news media and at other times attacked for taking it too far. From
being named on Time magazine’s list of the 100 most influential people in 2013,
having the show suspended on the Egyptian private satellite channel CBC and
protests erupting against its host, and then reappearing shortly after on the media
conglomerate MBC, Albernameg has been drawing a lot of attention among
Egyptians along the way.
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Albernameg has faced a lot of opposition. The suspension of the show on CBC,
and afterwards the jamming of MBC’s signal during the airing of Albernameg, ending
with the complete suspension of the show and taking it completely off the air raise
questions about the ability of the show to affect Egyptian public opinion. Do Bassem
Youssef and Albernameg pose a threat to the authorities leading them to seriously
pursue shutting down the show and taking its host off the airwaves? Then, another
issue comes into play, which is the credibility of Bassem Youssef as a source of
information, especially after he was involved in a plagiarism incident related to his
weekly column in Al Shorouk newspaper.	
  
This study examines the characteristics of Albernameg audience, their
motivations for watching the show, and whether they consider Albernameg a news
source. Furthermore, the study investigates the framing effects of the show on its
audience, by exploring whether media frames presented on the show correspond to
audience frames, in relation to perceptions of current issues. In this sense, this study
plays a role in bridging the gap between uses and gratification research and effects
studies, since it examines Albernameg’s audience characteristics and motivations for
viewing the show from a Uses & Gratifications perspective and links it to framing
effects of the show on its audience.
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PROBLEM	
  STATEMENT
Albernameg is a satirical format. However, if its audience considers it a
source of news and perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information,
their perceptions of current issues may be affected by the way social and political
issues are framed on the show. This could ultimately reflect on Egyptian public
opinion. This study explores the sociopolitical characteristics of Albernameg’s
audience, how they perceive the show and its presenter in terms of information
credibility, as well as whether their perceptions of current issues correspond to the
way these issues are framed on the show. Hence testing the presence of framing
effects on the show’s audience, or lack thereof.
SIGNIFICANCE	
  OF	
  THE	
  STUDY
This study plays a role in bridging the gap between “uses & gratifications”
and “media effects” research. It also sheds light on the important role of political
satire in shaping audiences’ perceptions of current issues. In addition, the study
associates literature on political satire, which is largely based on Western shows in
the genre, to its uses and effects in a Middle Eastern context.

	
  

4

CHAPTER	
  TWO	
  
THEORETICAL	
  FRAMEWORK	
  
A.	
  	
  	
  USES	
  &	
  GRATIFICATIONS
1.	
  BASIC	
  ASSUMPTIONS
Audience activity is the cornerstone of uses and gratifications research. It
refers to the audience’s intentionality, selectivity and involvement with the media
(Blumler, 1979). The uses and gratifications approach to media effects considers the
user as an active goal-oriented participant in the communication process, not merely a
passive receiver of media messages. The medium is one of various sources of
influence on the user. The characteristics, motivations, selectivity and involvement
of users influence their purposes, functions and uses of the media. These factors, in
turn, work as mediators or moderators of media effects. Users’ personal traits and
social environment help shape their expectations and desires in terms of media
consumption. They then actively and purposefully select media or messages that
satisfy these expectations and desires (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973).
According to Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch (1974), there are three main
objectives for uses and gratifications research: explaining how people use the media
to gratify their needs, understanding motivations behind media behavior and
identifying the consequences that follow from needs, motivations and behavior.
Katz, Haas & Gurevitch (1973) classified 35 media-related needs into five
categories: cognitive needs, affective needs, personal integrative needs, social
integrative needs and tension release needs. Cognitive needs are related to gaining
information, knowledge and understanding. Affective needs are related to
pleasurable, emotional and aesthetic experience. Personal integrative needs include
strengthening status, stability, credibility and confidence. Social integrative needs
relate to strengthening contacts with family and friends. Tension-release needs have
to do with escape and diversion (Katz, Haas & Gurevitch, 1973). According to Katz,
Blumler & Gurevitch (1974), surveillance and enjoyment, which relate to the
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aforementioned cognitive and affective needs respectively, are the principal and most
fundamental audience motivations for consuming media content.
Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch (1973) argue that media-related needs and media
uses can be deduced from the gratifications they satisfy. For example, the need for
security or the drive for satisfying curiosity and exploration could lead to the
surveillance function of the media, seeking reassurance that one is right results in
using the media to reinforce values and attitudes, needing to develop cognitive
mastery of one's environment can lead to using the media to correlate information.
Using the media for personal reference could be the result of need for self-esteem,
social utility function a result of need for affiliation and escape functions a result of
the need to reduce anxiety and release tension. They also contend that the link
between needs and need gratification through media use is not fully understood. An
example of this is the motives behind some people's use of the media to gain political
information versus others avoiding it. They suggest that the interaction of
psychological, sociological and environmental factors can lead audience members to
use the media in certain ways (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973).
2.	
  MOTIVATION	
  &	
  MEDIA	
  CONSUMPTION
According to Rubin (2009), media consumption choices are driven by media
consumption motivations. People’s motivations are derived from many factors, such
as their needs and interests. These motivations influence the uses of and
gratifications obtained from various media.
Palmgreen’s (1984) examination of a variety of uses and effects studies
concluded that there is a relationship between audience motivations and various
media effects, including knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of social reality. So
(2012) argues, however, that this link between motives of media use and effects of
that use, which was originally intended to be bridged by Uses and Gratifications
research, has been neglected in Uses and Gratifications studies. These studies have
focused instead primarily on measuring the impact of audience motivation on
“consequences of media exposure rather than effects.”
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So (2012) proposes a model of motivated media exposure and its impact on
risk perception, based on the two principal motivations for media consumption as
identified by previous literature: surveillance and enjoyment. The study tested the
effects of each motivation on risk perception separately, and then the effect of mixed
motivation. The central premise of the model is that audience motivation serves as a
“frame” through which audiences filter, interpret and process information they
receive from the mass media. The model entails four propositions. Firstly, that
audience’s motivation to consume media serves as a mental frame that guides
processing and interpretation of the media content. The first proposition is
recommended by the study for use in political communication research due to their
rapid diversification, more specifically into infotainment shows such as The Daily
Show with Jon Stewart. Secondly, that when audiences who consume media with
surveillance as a primary motivation are exposed to risk information through the
media, their social risk perception is more influenced than their personal risk
perception. Thirdly, that when audiences who consume media with enjoyment as a
primary motivation are exposed to risk information through the media, their personal
risk perception is more influenced than their social risk perception. Fourthly, that
when audiences consume media with mixed motivation of surveillance and
enjoyment, both social and personal risk perceptions are influenced to the same
degree. The fourth proposition is also discussed in light of infotainment shows such
as The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, as audiences seek these kinds of shows with
mixed motivation of both surveillance and enjoyment.
Lee (2013) measured the link between audience motivations and news
consumption. The study focused on four main types of motivation-driven news
consumption: information-motivated, entertainment-motivated, opinion-motivated
and social-motivated. Information-driven motivations relate to gaining new
information, following up on government performance, being an informed citizen and
satisfying one’s need to know. Entertainment-driven motivations include
entertainment, laughter, habit and having nothing better to do. Opinion-driven
motivations encompass helping form one’s opinion on different issues and being
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exposed to other people’s opinions, between like-minded and different views. Socialdriven motivations include appearing informed to others, being more sociable,
because most of one’s friends do and having something to talk about. Results suggest
that age is an important predictor of motivations. Entertainment and social purposes
were the main motivations for news consumption for younger adults, whereas older
adults were more likely to consume news for information and opinion reasons.
Moreover, political satire was linked to entertainment and opinion-driven motivations.
Those with information-driven motivations were least motivated to watch them. The
study also found slight differences in motivations within different programs inside the
political satire genre. Audience members with entertainment and opinion motivations
were equally driven to watch The Colbert Report, whereas entertainment-motivated
consumption was slightly higher for The Daily Show with Jon Stewart.
3.	
  MEDIA	
  ORIENTATION
Media use can be ritualized or instrumental. Ritualized use suggests a less
active or less goal-oriented state with the user being engaged with the medium in
order to consume time and for diversion, out of habit. Instrumental use, on the other
hand, entails intention, selectivity and involvement, with the user actively seeking
certain message content for informational reasons, such as greater exposure to news,
and perceiving that content to be realistic (Rubin, 1983).
Moody’s (2011) study on whether Australians’ political communication
choices are influenced by credibility or convenience indicates that media use patterns
are influenced by habit, as a result of everyday life practices, rather than consciously
and thoughtfully seeking information. The findings revealed that people repeatedly
refer to media they do not trust for political news and information. These findings
show that convenience trumps credibility when it comes to information selection.
Van Der Wurff (2011) also highlights the role of habit in media selection. His
study on online news media’s displacement of traditional ones shows that this process
depends on three factors. Firstly, it is influenced by users’ accessibility to the
medium. Secondly, time spent using a medium depends on the amount of
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gratifications sought and obtained by that medium. The more the gratifications the
user seeks and obtains from a medium, the more time they spend using that medium.
Thirdly, for media that are not limited by accessibility, habit plays an important role
in determining time spent using those media.
Instrumental orientations may produce stronger attitudinal and behavioral
effects than ritualized orientations because they include more motivation and
involvement with media messages, as well as perception of media messages to be
realistic (Rubin, 1983). According to Rubin and Perse (1987a, 1987b), instrumental
television use resulted in cognitive, affective and behavioral involvement with soap
opera programs and news. More specifically, it led to more active thinking and
consideration of the content, parasocial interaction with media personalities and
deliberating with others over content (Rubin & Perse, 1987a, 1987b).
This shows that media uses and effects are related. According to Windahl
(1981), media uses and media effects research are similar in terms of their attempts to
explain results and outcomes of media use. Media effects research does this by
looking at the communication process from the communicator’s perspective, whereas
uses research starts with the audience member and recognizes how far audience’s
activity and involvement can influence the communication process and its outcomes
(Windahl, 1981).
As previously noted, it is important to relate media uses and effects research
in order to bridge the gap between these two research areas (Windahl, 1981;
Palmgreen, 1984; So, 2012). Hence, this study investigates the Egyptian political
satire show, Albernameg, from a uses and gratifications perspective, as well as some
of its possible framing effects. 	
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B.	
  	
  	
  FRAMING
1.	
  THE	
  THEORY	
  &	
  FRAME	
  TYPOLOGY
The framing literature distinguishes between two types of frames: audience
frames and media frames (Scheufele, 1999). Within the context of audience frames,
framing can be defined as a process that can lead people to conceptualize an issue in a
specific way or re-evaluate the issue differently (Chong and Druckman, 2007a). In
this case, “the frame determines whether most people notice and how they understand
and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it”
(Entman, 1993).
As for media frames, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality
and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993).
Media frames can increase the salience of information as a result of the way
information is placed in terms of order, repetition or association to culturally familiar
symbols (Entman, 1993). Sources can also contribute to increasing salience. More
specifically, overrepresentation of certain sources can dictate a specific media frame,
especially when opposing voices are underrepresented or absent in media coverage
(Ross, 2003). This has significant consequences on audience frames because it
means the audience is only being exposed to one repetitive frame and not competing
ones. This can, in turn, increase the accessibility of this frame and consequently raise
the chances of its use in making judgments and attributions of responsibility (Baden
and Lecheler, 2012).
Media frames can be further broken down into episodic and thematic frames.
Episodic frames are event-oriented and take the form of case studies, such as stories
about the suffering of a homeless person or a drug addict. Thematic frames are more
universal, presenting abstract and general evidence, such as changes in government
welfare expenditures (Iyengar, 1994). Episodic and thematic frames can direct
attribution of responsibility for the framed issue either to the individual or society at
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large. In an experimental study about television news framing of poverty and
audience’s attribution of responsibility, Iyengar’s (1990) findings show that when
poverty is framed episodically, individuals are more likely to attribute responsibility
for poverty to the poor people themselves. Thematic frames, on the other hand, result
in throwing the blame on societal factors, such as failed governmental programs or
economic conditions (Iyengar, 1990).
2.	
  MEDIATING	
  PROCESSES
In order for a framing effect to occur, a given belief about an issue under
consideration has to be available, accessible and applicable. Out of all the beliefs
available and stored in an individual’s memory, framing renders only some accessible
when evaluating an issue. If the individual is motivated enough or faced with
opposing arguments, forming a stimulating competitive environment, he/she will
evaluate the applicability of the beliefs and form a judgment about which beliefs are
most applicable to the issue at hand (Chong and Druckman, 2007a).
Baden and Lecheler (2012) also discuss availability and applicability, and add
one more dimension: belief content change. Availability and applicability operate on
existing information in the receiver’s mind, whereas belief content change either
alters content of existing beliefs or adds new beliefs. The three processes are
complementary; they each contribute to the total framing effect. For example, highly
accessible information can be disregarded if it is deemed inapplicable. Also, using
applicable information and beliefs means that they were selectively activated and are
thus more accessible. Furthermore, relations can be built between previously
disconnected beliefs, as well as newly acquired beliefs being integrated into the
cognitive structure through applicability. This does not necessarily mean that all the
processes have to operate simultaneously. For example, framing effects can occur
based solely on accessing one set of unchallenged beliefs in a person’s mind rather
than another (Baden and Lecheler, 2012).
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3.	
  FRAMING	
  &	
  PUBLIC	
  OPINION
Iyengar (1991) states that controversial issues offer a challenge in the process
of attribution of responsibility. He argues that the public is incapable of determining
whom to blame for various incidents. The media, depending on how they frame the
event, can shape attributions of responsibility for social and political issues. Moreover,
individuals do not draw on all possible information they ever encounter to form
opinions about issues they are faced with; judgments, opinions, and decisions are
determined based on the information most easily retrievable from memory (Iyengar,
1991).
When individuals are exposed to competing frames, their response will likely
be one of two alternatives. They will either respond to the louder frame or to the
stronger frame. A loud frame is the frame most frequently repeated. Repetition can
be influential due to the fact that individuals do not always weigh the information
they receive consciously. They form opinions based on what they hear regularly and
thus most readily comes to mind. Repetition increases the accessibility of the frame.
A strong frame can be determined based on several factors. For example, a frame can
be deemed strong if it is communicated via a credible source and/or conforms to
strongly held beliefs (Chong and Druckman, 2007b).
Effects of competing frames are dependent upon whether the first frame was
stored and is accessible during exposure to the second frame, in order to be used as
context. If effects of the first frame had dissipated by the time of exposure to the
second frame, recency effects dominate competitive framing (Baden and Lecheler,
2012).
In an experimental survey design study that measured repetitive and
competitive news framing by tracing effects of two different frames across delayed
points in time: immediately after the first exposure, after 15 minutes, 1 day, 1 week
and 2 weeks, results showed that repetition did not have a substantial effect on
opinion unless the delay between two exposures is short. Competitive news framing
was strongly influenced by recency effects with the latest frame exposure being

	
  

12

decisive for opinion formation (Lecheler and de Vreese, 2013). This is in agreement
with Baden and Lecheler (2012) who suggest that framing effects are more durable
when some sort of learning occurs, such as by forming new applicability relations or
when belief content is changed (Baden and Lecheler, 2012).
4.	
  MODERATORS	
  OF	
  FRAMING	
  EFFECTS
Personal traits and individual differences can act as moderators of framing
effects. It is important to account for these variables in order not to assume powerful
media effects based on findings of framing effects research, when these factors can be
acting as confounding variables. There are several moderators to framing effects.
These include values and prior beliefs (Chong and Druckman, 2007a), source
credibility (Druckman, 2001), knowledge about the issue (Baden & Lecheler, 2012;
Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012; Druckman & Nelson,
2003; Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997; Detenber et al, 2007) and intensity of
emotional reactions (Aarøe, 2011).	
  
Values constitute one of the clearest limits on framing effects. “In general,
strong dispositions reduce framing effects by increasing one’s resistance to
disconfirming information.” However, even individuals who have strong values on
some issues are subject to framing effects on new issues that they do not have a firm
opinion on yet (Chong and Druckman, 2007a).
Source credibility is also a moderator of framing effects, with perceived
source credibility acting as a requirement for successful framing. Druckman (2001)
conducted two experiments in order to measure the impact of source credibility on
framing effects. The first experiment included two statements (humanitarian vs.
government expenditures) from two different sources (Colin Powell vs. Jerry
Springer) in order to measure the effect of source credibility on framing. The
statements tackled U.S. Congress consideration of proposals that would alter the
amount of federal assistance to the poor. Participants received one of four
statements: a Colin Powell humanitarian statement, a Colin Powell government
expenditures statement, a Jerry Springer humanitarian statement or a Jerry Springer
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government expenditures statement. A pretest indicated that Colin Powell was
perceived as a highly credible source, while Jerry Springer was a low credible source.
Results showed that participants who read a Colin Powell humanitarian statement
exhibited significantly greater support for assisting the poor than those who read a
Colin Powell government expenditure statement. The difference in opinion among
respondents who read a Jerry Springer humanitarian vs. government expenditure
statement was not significant (Druckman, 2001).
In the second experiment, participants were asked to read articles about a Ku
Klux Klan’s request to hold a rally, framed in terms of either freedom of speech or
public safety. Articles were portrayed as if they were from The New York Times and
The National Enquirer’s websites. A pretest showed that The New York Times was
rated as highly credible and The National Enquirer as a low credibility source.
Participants who read The New York Times public safety article were considerably
less tolerant of the rally than participants who read The New York Times free speech
article. In contrast, the difference between the responses of the participants who read
The National Enquirer public safety article and the responses of the participants who
read The National Enquirer free speech article was insignificant. Results of both
experiments show that perceived source credibility is a requirement for successful
framing (Druckman, 2001).
The level of knowledge a person has about an issue moderates framing effects.
However, the literature is indecisive as to the exact kind of these effects. On the one
hand, Baden and Lecheler (2012), argue that individuals with medium-knowledge
about an issue exhibit the most lasting framing effects, compared to those with high
or low knowledge (Baden & Lecheler, 2012). On the other hand, Lecheler and de
Vreese’s (2013) study, on the effects of repetitive and competitive news framing over
time, showed that participants with a higher level of political knowledge exhibited
greater accumulation of framing effects and weaker recency effects when the delay
between the first and second exposures was short (Lecheler & de Vresse, 2013).
They argue that susceptibility to framing effects increases for individuals with higher
levels of knowledge on an issue (Lecheler and de Vreese, 2012). The knowledge
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they have assists in processing the frames they are exposed to, resulting in stronger
framing effects (Druckman and Nelson, 2003). Framing activates existing beliefs and
cognitions among individuals familiar with frames (Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997).
On the other hand, according to Detenber et al (2007), knowledge can sometimes
limit framing effects. Respondents who had knowledge about abortion, studied in
their research as a pro-life or pro-choice issue, along with feeling strongly about it
through personal experience or past exposure to news stories, showed limited
influence by framing effects (Detenber et al, 2007).
According to Aarøe (2011), the intensity of individuals’ emotional reactions
determines the extent of the effect episodic or thematic frames have on them. The
study indicates that episodic frames elicit stronger emotional reactions towards the
given framing of the issue. They also have more capacity to influence opinion
because they provide a specific focal point of reaction, towards which receivers can
channel their emotional reactions. However, when no emotional reactions are elicited,
thematic frames have a stronger influence on opinion (Aarøe, 2011).
5.	
  A	
  PROCESS	
  MODEL	
  OF	
  FRAMING
Scheufele (1999) argues that framing can be viewed as a process model
incorporating inputs, processes and outcomes, wherein outcomes of certain processes
serve as inputs for subsequent processes. More specifically, the model includes four
processes: frame building, frame setting, individual-level effects of framing and a link
between individual frames and media frames. This process model argues that
organizational pressures, ideologies, attitudes and other elites (input) engage in a
process of frame building that results in media frames (outcome). Media frames
engage in a process of frame setting, or increasing the salience and importance of
specific frames, which, in turn, produces audience frames. Individual-level effects of
framing then lead to attributions of responsibility, attitudes and behaviors. Journalists
are also susceptible to these effects, taking them back full circle into the ideologies
and attitudes that shape media frames. Taking a closer look at the two processes of
frame building and frame setting, frame building refers to the process by which
frames applied by journalists are created or altered. The main concern here is the
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kinds of organizational or structural factors of the media system, or the individual
characteristics of journalists, that can influence how media content is framed. Within
the frame setting process, there is a distinction between frame salience and perceived
importance of the frame. Perceived importance of frames is a result of conscious
information gathering and processing, unlike frame salience, which has to do with the
accessibility of the frame and how available and easily retrievable it is from memory
(Scheufele, 1999).
This process model concurs with Entman’s (1993) notion that a frame is an
“imprint of power”, reflecting the interests of politicians or elite groups who exert
their influence on media texts in an attempt to gain public support for their policies
(Entman, 1993). Hamdy and Gomaa’s (2012) discussion of the findings of their
content analysis study about how the Egyptian uprising was framed in state-run
newspapers, independent newspapers and social media, also coincides with
Scheufele’s (1999) model. Their study shows that different, and sometimes
contrasting, frames were used in each medium, with independent newspapers using
the widest variety of frames in all three media. The researchers refer this to the
ownership and nature of the publications themselves, as well as the journalists’
attitudes, and social and political loyalties (Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012). This is
referred to in Scheufele’s (1999) model as part of the frame building process, which
results in media frames.
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CHAPTER	
  THREE	
  
LITERATURE	
  REVIEW	
  
	
  
A. THE	
  SATIRE	
  GENRE

The political satire genre reveals a new face of infotainment, mixing news
with entertainment and introducing politics to comedy in a fusion of humor and
argument. It offers a new form of hybrid political media for conceptualizing and
contextualizing news and politics (Baym, 2007).
Shows within this genre, such as The Daily Show and The Colbert Report,
present, criticize and parody the news, leading to their labeling as “fake news”
(Borden and Tew, 2007). They are also referred to as news parody (Baym & Jones,
2012), sociopolitical satire (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013) and late-night comedy (Baek
and Wojcieszak, 2009).
B.	
  	
  	
  PARODY	
  AS	
  MEDIA	
  CRITICISM
This genre acknowledges “news as representation rather than reality,” with its
hosts acting as media critics (Meddaugh, 2010). Parody serves as a watchdog of the
news media and current affairs programs, scrutinizing their claims at offering the
absolute truth with the utmost professionalism, and breaking down hegemonic
discourses by drawing attention to the agendas that drive mainstream media (Baym &
Jones, 2012), as well as how the news is framed in ways in keeping with commercial
interests (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013).
Traditional and fake news both require a degree of civic participation, by
following the news and trying to comprehend the important issues. However, with
traditional news comes an expectation that the news presented is perceived by the
audience as “the truth,” without second-guessing the importance or context of the
version of the truth they are being offered. Fake news, on the other hand, deals with
its audience as competent equals (Borden and Tew, 2007).
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By acting as a form of media criticism, fake news contributes to media ethics.
Journalistic routines; namely gatekeeping, factuality and objectivity have their pitfalls.
Journalists try to ensure quality and reliability by choosing what is significant through
gatekeeping practices. They strive for factuality by only including facts that can be
checked out, and always aim for objectivity. This leads journalists to become
controlled by their sources, reproducing and with time solidifying official views and
dominant discourses. Because fake news is not constrained by the same journalistic
routines, it is able to demonstrate how the same “facts” can be understood and
contextualized differently. It also speaks of what is left unsaid and highlights the
absurdity of what is sometimes said (Borden and Tew, 2007).
However, these shows are dichotomous in nature with their content reflecting
strong hegemonic elements, as well as anti-hegemonic ones (Anderson & Kincaid,
2013). Fedechko & Vandenberg (2011) argue that Jon Stewart poses as a counterhegemon to the system by merely appearing to challenge it. However, what he really
does is offer a façade of democracy, pacifying viewers by laughing at the media and
politics, without any substantial content that could lead to real opposition or action
(Fedechko & Vandenberg, 2011). Furthermore, although the show is hailed as
subversive and dissident, in many instances its humor relies on demeaning
stereotypes of foreigners (Ross & York, 2007) “serving to legitimate jingoistic
American normativity” (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013).
C.	
  	
  	
  POLITICAL	
  SATIRE	
  &	
  DEMOCRATIC	
  CULTURE
Satire acts as a media literacy platform, involving its audiences in observing
the deficiencies inherent in media and politics, “through participation rather than
instruction” (Meddaugh, 2010). Discourse analysis of the two American satire
shows: The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report, using the
Propaganda Model, shows that although the two programs are in line with the
Propaganda Model’s predictions regarding structural constraints on the media, they
did in fact dissect mainstream news content in a way that could promote informed
discussion and democratic culture (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013).
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A survey study of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report
showed that respondents who watch the show for its humor, also report that they
watch to learn about the news. This suggests that the two processes of learning and
laughter may occur simultaneously. Moreover, those who tune in for background and
context on previously acquired information show a higher need for cognition, casting
the parody genre as an educational platform encouraging critical thinking and linking
constructs together to gain insight (Young, 2013).
Not all effects of satire are intended. Exposure to satire can result in
unintended positive effects. These include "positive democratic communicative
activities" such as political discussion and viewing debates. Viewing debates was
found to be a crucial link between watching late night comedy and political
discussion. Moreover, viewing late night comedy encourages debate viewing, and
this in turn facilitates post-debate political discussions. These effects are stronger on
younger audiences (Landreville, Holbert & LaMarre, 2010).
Nevertheless, these unintended effects can sometimes backfire. With young
viewers failing to understand the implicit messages of The Colbert Report, the show
tends to publicize and increase support for the conservative right-wing messages that
it is mocking (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). Similarly, while The Daily Show
increases internal efficacy and cynicism, which could be healthy in terms of
democracy and citizenship, it lowers trust and confidence in the electoral process and
the media, which may in turn reduce political participation among young adults
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2006).
D.	
  	
  	
  SATIRE	
  AUDIENCES’	
  POLITICAL	
  PROFILES
1.	
  AFFINITY	
  FOR	
  POLITICAL	
  HUMOR
Hmielowski and Holbert’s (2011) study on factors predicting audiences’
exposure to political satire identified exposure to satirical sitcoms, exposure to liberal
cable news programming and affinity for political humor as important variables. In
their research, they identify four dimensions that can determine an individual’s
affinity for political humor: humor’s ability to highlight incongruity, to provide to a
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sense of superiority, to relieve stress or anxiety and to help connect with others
(Hmielowski and Holbert, 2011).
Incongruity refers to laughter at the unexpected or when other people call
attention to social inconsistencies. People have to be familiar with and understand a
society’s norms in order to recognize inconsistencies. The superiority dimension is
related to people’s tendency to laugh at matters when it gives them a sense of
superiority or triumph over others. The anxiety dimension has to do with humor’s
ability to ease tension of socially awkward situations (Meyer, 2000). The last
dimension is related to social functions of humor as a way to connect with others
(Hmielowski and Holbert, 2011).
2.	
  POLITICAL	
  EFFICACY
Political efficacy relates to an individual’s belief that he/she is competent
enough and capable of influencing the political system. Political efficacy has two
dimensions: internal and external. External political efficacy has to do with how far
the individual sees governmental authorities and institutions as effective and
responsive, and the political environment at large as trustworthy. Internal political
efficacy deals with the individual’s level of confidence in his/her ability to participate
in the political process. The higher the internal political efficacy of an individual, the
more confident they are in their ability to engage in political activities and influence
the political system (Zimmerman, 1989; Niemi, Craig & Mattei, 1991).
Applying a uses and gratifications approach to a study of The Daily Show
with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report suggests that audiences who watch the show
for entertainment, also tune in for information. Those who avoid the shows are low
on political knowledge and efficacy, so they do not have the necessary knowledge to
understand the jokes (Young, 2013). Hoffman & Young (2011) suggest that viewing
political parody and satire could increase political efficacy and participation, because
it focuses on issues and policies, making them more salient to their viewers (Hoffman
& Young, 2011).
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These effects are not universal among all the shows within the satire genre.
Baumgartner & Morris (2008) argue that The Colbert Report leaves its young viewers
less confident in their capability to comprehend politics. This is a result of confusion
between the show’s implicit and explicit messages (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008).
The Daily Show, on the other hand, simplifies politics for young adults, clarifying it
and making it more understandable. Thus, it raises viewers’ internal political efficacy
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2006).
Moreover, exposure to satire and traditional news sources can affect one
another. According to Young (2013), viewers of The Daily Show and the Colbert
Report who report watching because these shows make the news fun, acknowledge
that they are referring to news they acquired elsewhere (from reading newspapers or
watching the news). This suggests that the shows made already-acquired information
entertaining in a secondary way (Young, 2013). Furthermore, experimental analysis
of the primacy effects of watching The Daily Show and CNN Headline News shows
that both media forms influence the perception of each other. Watching one form
prior to the other leads to decreasing the perceived political gratifications associated
with the second form the viewer is exposed to. In addition, viewers with low internal
political efficacy are more vulnerable to being affected by what The Daily Show says
about national TV news, leading them to think less of national news as a source of
political information (Holbert et al, 2007).
Hoffman and Thomson’s (2009) study about the effect of TV viewing on
adolescents’ civic participation shows that internal political efficacy mediates the
positive relationship between viewing local news and late-night comedy and
adolescents’ civic participation. Although external political efficacy decreased, with
youth having negative feelings towards the government and politics, the increase in
their internal political efficacy left them feeling more empowered and competent in
their ability to participate in the political arena (Hoffman and Thomson, 2009).
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3.	
  POLITICAL	
  INTEREST	
  &	
  KNOWLEDGE
Experimental research on political comedy programs suggests that when less
politically interested viewers are exposed to a certain political issue on a comedy
program, they are more likely to become motivated to pay more attention to and
pursue knowledge of that issue in other media. Since comedy helps in breaking down
complex political issues, it facilitates understanding these topics in other media.
Hence, exposure to political comedy can increase political awareness and knowledge
among its less politically interested viewers (Xenos & Becker, 2009).
Young & Tisinger (2006) contend that young late-night comedy viewers are
not using satire shows as their sole source of news and political information. They
are watching both late-night comedy as well as traditional news. Significant positive
correlations were found between watching and learning from late-night comedy
(including The Late Show with David Letterman, The Tonight Show with Jay Leno
or The Daily Show with Jon Stewart) and watching and learning from traditional
forms of news (including local news, cable news and national network news). One
limitation to these findings is that general media use could be acting as a confounding
variable, since heavy TV viewers are more likely to report higher viewing of all
forms of TV programs. However, the results still prove that late-night viewers are at
least not less likely to watch news (Young & Tisinger, 2006).
When it comes to political campaigns, young viewers identify comedy and
late-night shows as a source of news about the campaigns. Exposure to these shows
is associated with recognition of information about the campaign, rather than recall of
information. This means that the information young people already know is
enhanced by viewing comedy shows, with little increase in actual recall of campaignrelated information (Hollander, 2005).
Political candidate interviews on late night shows can engage initially
politically uninterested viewers due to their entertainment aspects. This facilitates
learning about political issues, making policy considerations more accessible and can
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hence be used, when seen as relevant, in assessing presidential candidates (Parkin,
2010).
Baum (2003) argues that politically inattentive low-education soft news
viewers are more likely to gain political knowledge from late-night comedy than
politically attentive higher educated ones (Baum, 2003). Baek and Wojcieszak
(2009) also contend that watching late-night comedy increases knowledge about
widely known, relatively easy political issues. This effect is especially pronounced
among politically inattentive viewers. Politically attentive viewers, on the other hand,
do not gain more political knowledge. Late-night viewing for these viewers results in
entertainment and diversion. However, since the survey employed in this research
measured political knowledge using multiple-choice questions, the results can only be
discussed in terms of recognition rather than recall of information. This begs the
question of whether the same results would emerge if respondents are asked to recall
information from memory (Baek and Wojcieszak, 2009).
Cao (2010) established a link between watching Jon Stewart's The Daily
Show and the public awareness of two main issues covered by the program at that
time, the war in Afghanistan and the 2004 presidential elections. The research
concluded that Jon Stewart's show was one of the main sources that provided political
information for the American public (Cao, 2010). Furthermore, Brewer and Cao
(2006) found that the appearance of presidential candidates on political comedy
shows correlated with an increase in viewers' knowledge of these candidates’
campaigns (Brewer & Cao, 2006).
E.	
  	
  POLITICAL	
  SATIRE	
  IN	
  EGYPT	
  
In Egypt, political satire was present in the media arena with Mohamed Azab,
an Egyptian comedian, launching his program The Azab Show in 2010, mocking the
Egyptian government and Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif’s cabinet, but the program
was banned until the 25 January 2011 revolution. TV presenter, Akram Hosni, also
started a satirical program in which he created a character called Sayed Abu Hafiza, a
news presenter reporting the news in a comedic way and mocking famous figures
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(ElGabry, 2014; Younis, 2014). The genre, however, really started flourishing with
Bassem Youssef’s show “Albernameg”, which literally translates into “The Show”.
Research on Albernameg shows that the audience’s main motive for watching
it is entertainment, but that they also consider it a source of news, to gain a better
understanding of politics. In addition, the show has an influence on viewers’
perceptions of the political situation, but does not affect their political engagement or
participation (ElGabry, 2014; Younis, 2014). 	
  
	
  
F.	
  	
  	
  OVERVIEW	
  OF	
  BASSEM	
  YOUSSEF	
  &	
  ALBERNAMEG
1.	
  HOW	
  IT	
  ALL	
  STARTED
Bassem Youssef started his show on YouTube in March 2011. At the time,
the show was called B+. He gained widespread popularity through his satirical
criticism of the hypocrisy and inconsistency of traditional media in their coverage of
the 25th of January revolution. The show got more than five million views in its first
three months on YouTube and Youssef started being referred to as the Egyptian Jon
Stewart. The Egyptian private channel ONTV offered Youssef a deal to air his show,
making Youssef the first person in the Middle East whose show makes the transition
from social media to television. The first episode of “Albernameg”, the new name
the show took on, aired in Ramadan 2011. In January 2012, Jon Stewart interviewed
Bassem Youssef on The Daily Show. The segment in which Stewart interviewed
Youssef was one of the highest viewed videos on Stewart’s website (Albernameg).
Today, Bassem Youssef and his show have over two million followers on Twitter and
six million fans on Facebook.
Youssef then moved from ONTV to CBC. Mohammed Morsi was the
president at the time. Youssef mocked Morsi and his Islamist allies for their mixing
of politics and religion. This contributed to the show’s soaring popularity. However,
his mockery of the president lead him to get detained for a short while and released
on bail under Morsi’s rule for insulting the president and Islam (Rizk, 2014).
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2.	
  TEMPORARY	
  SUSPENSION	
  OF	
  THE	
  SHOW
CBC stopped airing Albernameg in November 2013 after the season’s first
episode, following protests calling for Bassem Youssef’s removal, because he poked
fun at the army chief Abdel Fattah El Sisi and his supporters. The channel argued
that Youssef violated its editorial policies and contractual obligations, as well as
attacked symbols of the state (Rizk, 2014). The Egyptian government said that the
decision was between Youssef and the station, and that the government had nothing
to do with the show’s cancellation (“German TV to give Egypt satirist pan-Arab
airing”). Presidential media advisor Ahmed Al-Moslimany emphasized the interim
government’s support of freedom of speech, adding that the CBC decision was an
internal matter (T. Rose, 2013).
Youssef himself did not relate the show’s cancellation to direct orders from
the government, but rather referred it to the political environment after Morsi’s
overthrow. "You can always implement some sort of a mood, without actually giving
direct orders," Youssef said in an interview with the Observer. He said that even if
the authorities were not directly involved, this reflects badly on freedom of speech in
Egypt. Youssef also added that CBC had his back throughout Morsi’s rule,
supporting him all the way before 30 June, but things changed when it came to Sisi,
and CBC cancelled the program. "They said I was speaking about things I should not
be speaking about... insulting national symbols. But, you know, Morsi was the
president: he was a national symbol" (Kingsley, 2014).
Several political figures, parties and organizations condemned and denounced
the show’s suspension, including Misr Al-Qawia, Mohamed ElBaradei and the 6th of
April Movement. The Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI)
considered the show’s suspension “a blow to the freedom of expression after 30 June
and confirms the return of businessmen owning the media to impose self-censorship
in order to preserve their interests with authority” and demanded that Youssef goes
back on air (T. Rose, 2013). Reporters Without Borders regretted the suspension of
Bassem Youssef’s show, saying that “Freedom of satirically critical expression,
especially in the context of a humor program, must have a place in a country that
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aspires to democracy” (“Watchdog slams Egypt for curbing press freedom”).
3.	
  ALBERNAMEG	
  IS	
  BACK	
  
Following the show’s suspension on CBC, Youssef and his team moved to
MBC Egypt in February 2014. On the premiere of his show on MBC Egypt, Youssef
made fun of the Sisi mania that was taking over the country and how TV programs,
completely unrelated to politics, go out of their way to mention Sisi. He humorously
included Sisi in all aspects of life from cooking to songs (“Egypt comedian back on
air, mocking Sisi mania”; Rizk, 2014; “German TV to give Egypt satirist pan-Arab
airing.”).
This upset some of his fans, but Youssef said in an interview with the
Associated Press that he thinks people were upset because the show took a unique
tone, not siding with the regime but not totally against it at the same time. He added
that he does not consider his show “a tool to bring down regimes,” but that he sees his
show as a “healthy cathartic way of freedom of expression” and a way of dealing with
people’s differences. He argued that allowing this kind of programming reflects well
on the government. Youssef also referred to how it has become very sensitive to
tackle all sorts of issues, with the split in the country and the army nationalism fervor
being sky high, him and his team have to tiptoe around any issues they address, but
that they are not intimidated and do not self-censor (Rohan, 2014).
Deutche Welle, the German-based broadcaster, also decided to start airing
Albernameg on its international Arabic channel and online immediately after its
premiere on MBC Egypt. Deutsche Welle Director General Peter Limbourg said that
this way Youssef 's show will reach people across the region and that the decision
was meant as "a clear stance in favor of freedom of the press and opinion" (“German
TV to give Egypt satirist pan-Arab airing”).
However, even after the transition to MBC Egypt, the channel’s signal was
jammed two weeks in a row, while Albernameg was airing. Although the source of
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jamming was unknown, MBC’s spokesperson Mazen Hayek said that they believed it
was deliberate (Rizk, 2014; T. Rose, 2014).
4.	
  HONORS	
  &	
  AWARDS
Bassem Youssef and his show have won several awards. In 2013, Youssef
was named by TIME magazine one of the 100 most influential people in the world
and was crowned “Man of the Year” at the Esquire Middle East Award on Dec. 5,
2013 (“Bassem Youssef: Egypt’s freedom-of-speech icon”). According to Google’s
2013 top search report Zeitgeist, the top trending search for people in Egypt was
Bassem Youssef and the most searched TV show was Albernameg (Aggour, 2013).
YouTube Rewind report, which reports on the top trending and most talked about
videos of the year, also revealed Youssef’s show as the top trending Arabic talk show
in 2013 (“Videos: YouTube reveals top Middle East videos”).
Bassem Youssef was one of four journalists presented with the 2013
International Press Freedom Awards by The Committee to Protect Journalists. The
committee said in a statement that the Press freedom Awards seek to recognize the
type of "courageous reporting that defines free media.” Jon Stewart presented
Youssef with the award which Youssef was amazed at receiving “considering the fact
that I am not even a journalist,” he said (Astor, 2013). Foreign Policy magazine also
chose Youssef among its global thinkers in 2013, highlighting his contribution
through his weekly column in Al Shorouk newspaper, as well as his satire show
(“Bassem Youssef, Heba Morayef and Hossam Bahget among 2013 FP global
thinkers”).
5.	
  THE	
  PLAGIARISM	
  INCIDENT
Bassem Youssef used to write a weekly column in Al Shorouk newspaper.
However, his column led him to trouble. One of Youssef’s columns in March 2014
was discussing Russia’s ties with the West. This column, however, turned out to be
plagiarized from an article published on the website politico.com by journalist Ben
Judah. According to Judah, Youssef lightly rephrased whole chunks of his work and
did not cite him as a source. Upon confrontation on Twitter by Judah, Youssef
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claimed he had forgotten to cite Judah due to work stress. This plagiarism scandal
took social media by storm, with lots of audience members refusing Youssef’s twitter
apology that followed hours after, even though the original article owner had
accepted Youssef’s apology. Some audience members tweeted that Youssef only
apologized because he was busted and that he was a hypocrite for pointing out
media’s lack of professionalism and ethics when he was doing the same (Judah, 2014;
“Scourge of Egypt media mocked for plagiarism”). On the following episode of
Albernameg, Youssef brought up the incident and apologized for his actions, thanking
audiences who criticized him and put him back in his place, and announced that he
will be taking a break from writing his column for a while.
6.	
  ALBERNAMEG	
  GOES	
  OFF	
  THE	
  AIR
On June 2nd, 2014, Bassem Youssef held a press conference announcing that
Albernameg is stopping for good. He thanked MBC for their support and their
transparency in telling them that the channel was under immense pressure to stop the
show, without trying to blame it on the audience being angry or other reasons that
were not real. He said that officials decided to stop airing the final episode of
Albernameg without even reviewing or watching it, which means that the problem is
with the show itself, not the content of specific episodes. He added that Albernameg
got offers to air on foreign channels, but he and his team decided not to go down that
road because they would be called traitors. On whether the show would continue on
YouTube, he said that it is not financially possible due to the size of the team and the
production. Bassem Youssef said that Albernameg is supposed to be a comedy show
and that he wasn’t an activist, but despite that, he was summoned by the public
prosecutor, the show was suspended and its signal jammed several times, and more
lawsuits were filed against the show during the rule of the Muslim Brothers and
afterwards, than any other show in history. He added that even though Albernameg
was faced with a lot of intimidation, the show still went on air every week, but that
this is not a suitable environment for a comedy show. Youssef said that he was tired
of struggling, stressing and always fearing for his own safety, and his family’s and
the people surrounding him. He concluded by saying that suspending Albernameg is
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a victory for the show because it sends a much stronger and louder message than its
continuity.
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CHAPTER	
  FOUR	
  
RESEARCH	
  QUESTIONS	
  &	
  HYPOTHESES	
  
Research on political satire indicates that different types of satire lead to distinct
influences on viewers (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008;
Holbert et al, 2013). For example, Baumgartner & Morris (2006) argue that The
Daily Show increases its audience’s internal political efficacy because it simplifies
politics (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006), whereas The Colbert Report decreases
viewers’ confidence in their ability to comprehend politics as a result of confusion
between the show’s implicit and explicit messages (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008).
Viewers of different comedy shows are not homogeneous in nature. The Daily
Show's audience was found to be more politically interested and knowledgeable than
Leno and Letterman viewers (Young & Tisinger, 2006). Even with exposure to the
same show, different audience characteristics, such as varying political affiliations
and levels of political knowledge, may result in distinct effects on viewers (Young,
2004; Young & Tisinger, 2006).
Watching political satire can raise its viewers’ internal political efficacy as it
makes politics more understandable (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006), leaving viewers
feeling more empowered and competent in their ability to participate in the political
arena (Hoffman and Thomson, 2009). On the other hand, external political efficacy
decreases, with an increase in negative feelings towards the government and politics
(Hoffman and Thomson, 2009).
Viewers’ uses and gratifications sought from watching satire also differ
according to their characteristics. For example, The Daily Show and The Colbert
Report viewers who report watching the shows for background and context on
previously acquired information show a higher need for cognition (Young, 2013).
Exposure to political comedy can also increase political awareness and knowledge
among its less politically interested viewers (Xenos & Becker, 2009; Parkin, 2010).
Baum (2003) argues that politically inattentive low-education soft news viewers are
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more likely to gain political knowledge from late-night comedy than politically
attentive higher educated ones (Baum, 2003). Baek and Wojcieszak (2009) also
contend that watching late-night comedy increases knowledge about political issues
among politically inattentive viewers, whereas for politically attentive ones, viewing
results in entertainment and diversion (Baek and Wojcieszak, 2009). This coincides
with the assumptions of the uses and gratifications approach.
According to the uses and gratifications approach, the characteristics,
motivations, selectivity and involvement of users influence their purposes, functions
and uses of the media. These factors in turn work as mediators or moderators of
media effects (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973). Users’ personal traits and social
environment help shape their expectations and desires in terms of media consumption.
They then actively and purposefully select media or messages that satisfy these
expectations and desires (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973).
According to Rubin (2009), media consumption choices are driven by media
consumption motivations.	
  	
  These motivations influence the uses of and gratifications
obtained from various media. 	
  Palmgreen’s (1984) examination of a variety of uses
and effects studies concluded that there is a relationship between audience
motivations and various media effects, including knowledge, attitudes and
perceptions of social reality. 	
  
Since Albernameg is a new satire show operating in a different sociopolitical
and cultural context than the satire programs researched in existing literature; an Arab
Egyptian context rather than the largely Western context researched in previous
studies, it is important to examine who watched Albernameg and why did viewers
tune in to watch it? More specifically, the characteristics of the audience who tuned
in to watch Albernameg, as well as how these characteristics shape viewers’
expectations of the show and their motivations to watch it. This leads to the
following research questions:
RQ1: What are the socio-political characteristics of Albernameg audience?
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RQ2: What are Albernameg audience’s motivations for watching the show?
Previous studies are not in agreement when it comes to motivations behind
watching political satire. So (2012) postulates that audience’s motivation to consume
media serves as a mental frame that guides processing and interpretation of the media
content, arguing that when it comes to infotainment shows such as The Daily Show
with Jon Stewart, audiences are expected to consume media with mixed motivation of
surveillance and enjoyment. Nevertheless, Lee’s (2013) study on the link between
audience motivations and news consumption showed that	
  political satire was linked
to entertainment and opinion-driven motivations, with audiences who are
information-driven being the least motivated to watch them. Due there is a
discrepancy in literature on the motivations behind watching political satire, as
aforementioned, and since surveillance and enjoyment being the principal and most
fundamental audience motivations for consuming media content in general (Katz,
Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974), this study focuses on examining these two main
motivations and their possible consequences in terms of framing effects. 	
  
According to Rubin (1983), viewers who seek media content for informational
reasons tend to perceive that content to be realistic, and are thus more likely to be
influenced by the media messages they are exposed to. This leads to the assumption
that viewers who watch Albernameg, for informational reasons may be more likely to
exhibit stronger framing effects in relation to issues presented on the show, than those
who tune in for entertainment. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: There is a relationship between viewing motivations and perceptions of issues
presented on the show.
The media, depending on how they frame the event, can shape attributions of
responsibility for social and political issues. Moreover, individuals do not draw on all
possible information they ever encounter to form opinions about issues they are faced
with; judgments, opinions, and decisions are determined based on the information
most easily retrievable from memory (Iyengar, 1991). When individuals are exposed
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to competing frames, they either respond to the louder frame or to the stronger frame.
A loud frame is the frame most frequently repeated. Repetition can be influential due
to the fact that individuals do not always weigh the information they receive
consciously. They form opinions based on what they hear regularly and thus most
readily comes to mind. Repetition increases the accessibility of the frame (Chong
and Druckman, 2007b). This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of issues
presented on the show.
A strong frame can be determined based on several factors. For example, a
frame can be deemed strong if it is communicated via a credible source and/or
conforms to strongly held beliefs (Chong and Druckman, 2007b). According to
Druckman (2001), perceived source credibility is a requirement for successful
framing (Druckman, 2001). This relates to the question of whether the audience
considers Bassem Youssef a credible source of information, especially after his
involvement in a plagiarism incident. This builds up to the third hypothesis:
H3: There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible
source of information and perceptions of issues presented on the show.
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A.	
  RESEARCH	
  QUESTIONS
The study is concerned with two main research questions. Each research question has
several sub-questions.
RQ1: What are the socio-political characteristics of Albernameg audience?

•

RQ1a: What are Albernameg audience’s demographic characteristics?

•

RQ1b: Is Albernameg’s audience interested in politics and public affairs?

•

RQ1c: Is Albernameg’s audience attentive to politics and public affairs?

•

RQ1d: Is Albernameg’s audience politically knowledgeable?

•

RQ1e: Do Albernameg audience have internal and external political efficacy?

RQ2: What are Albernameg audience’s motivations for watching the show?

•

RQ2a: Does the audience consider Albernameg a source of news?

•

RQ2b: Is Albernameg’s audience being exposed to traditional news sources,
or is Albernameg their sole source of news?

•

RQ2c: Does the audience perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of
information?
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B. HYPOTHESES

Based on the literature review, the researcher formulated three hypotheses. Framing
effects are measured, in all three hypotheses, in relation to two issues, one responding
to frame repetition and the other to frame strength. The frame used to test repetition
is perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device and frame strength is measured
on the issue of using coal in Egypt to generate electricity. These frames were chosen
based on qualitative content analysis of Albernameg episodes.
H1: There is a relationship between viewing motivations and perceptions of the
AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.

•

H1a: Viewers who watched Albernameg for information are more likely to
have a negative perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device than those
who watched for entertainment.

•

H1b: Viewers who watched Albernameg for information are more likely to
have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity than those who
watched for entertainment.

H2: There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of the
AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.

•

H2a: Heavy viewers of Albernameg are more likely to have a negative
perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device than light viewers.

•

H2b: Heavy viewers of Albernameg are more likely to have a negative
perception of using coal to generate electricity than light viewers.

H3: There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible
source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and
using coal to generate electricity.
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•

H3a: Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of
information are more likely to have a negative perception of the AIDS & virus
C detection device.

•

H3b: Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of
information are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to
generate electricity.
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C.	
  	
  	
  OPERATIONALIZATION	
  OF	
  VARIABLES	
  
RQ1: What are the socio-political characteristics of Albernameg’s audience?
RQ1a: What are Albernameg audience’s demographic characteristics?
Albernameg audience’s demographics are measured by asking respondents the
following questions on the questionnaire:
§ Variable: Age
Age: (less than 18, from 18 to 25, more than 25 to 35, more than 35 to 45, more than
45 to 55, more than 55)
Level of measurement: Interval
§ Variable: Gender
Gender: (male, female)
Level of measurement: Nominal
§ Variable: Education
Educational level: (illiterate, certificate for illiteracy, primary, preparatory, secondary
degree or its equivalent, university degree, master’s degree, doctorate [Ph.D.], other)
Level of measurement: Nominal
§ Variable: Average Income
Average monthly income of the family: (less than 1000, from 1000 to 2000, more
than 2000 to 5000, more than 5000)
Level of measurement: Ordinal
§ Variable: Occupation
Occupation: (student, not working, private sector, public sector, retiree, other)
Level of measurement: Nominal
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RQ1b: Is Albernameg’s audience interested in politics and public affairs?
§ Variable: Political Interest
Political interest is measured by asking respondents the following question: How
interested are you in what is going on with politics and public affairs? (extremely,
somewhat, not at all)
Level of measurement: Interval
RQ1c: Is Albernameg’s audience attentive to politics and public affairs?
§ Variable: Political Attention
Political attention is measured by asking respondents the following question: How
often do you pay attention to information about politics and public affairs? (very
often, sometimes, never)
Level of measurement: Interval
RQ1d: Is Albernameg’s audience politically knowledgeable?
§ Variable: Political Knowledge
Political knowledge is measured using multiple choice questions related to local,
regional and international politics.
1. Who was appointed as interim Egyptian president after Morsi? (Ibrahim
Mahlab, Adly Mansour, Essam Sharaf, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, I don’t
know)
2. What is the nationality of the airline whose plane went missing last March?
(Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, I don’t know)
3. Who won the latest Algerian presidential elections? (Moncef Marzouki, Abdel
Aziz Bouteflika, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Omar Al Bashir, I don’t know)
4. Which city were Russia and Ukraine fighting over? (Crimea, Moscow,
Bucharest, Minsk, I don’t know)
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Respondents who do not answer any questions correctly are categorized as having
low political knowledge, those who answer one or two questions correctly are in the
category of medium political knowledge, and those who answer three or four
questions correctly are categorized as highly politically knowledgeable.
Level of measurement: Nominal
RQ1e: Do Albernameg audience have internal and external political efficacy?
§ Variable: Internal Political Efficacy
Internal political efficacy is measured following Niemi et al’s (1991) scheme.
Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the
following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5=
Strongly agree.
1. I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics.
2. I think that I am better informed about politics than most people.
3. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues
facing our country.
4. Sometimes politics seems so complicated that a person like me cannot really
understand what is going on. (reverse coding)
Level of measurement: Interval
§ Variable: External Political Efficacy
External political efficacy is defined as the extent to which an individual sees
governmental authorities and institutions as effective and responsive, and the political
environment at large as trustworthy (Zimmerman, 1989; Niemi, Craig & Mattei,
1991). It is measured following Hoffman and Thomson’s (2009) scheme for
measuring political cynicism.
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Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the
following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5=
Strongly agree.
1. Elected officials almost never keep campaign promises.
2. Politicians will say almost anything to get elected.
3. The government wastes a lot of the taxpayer’s money.
Level of measurement: Interval
RQ2: What are Albernameg audience’s motivations for watching the show?
RQ2a: Does the audience consider Albernameg a source of news?
This is measured in the questionnaire using the following question: Why did you
watch Albernameg? You can choose more than one answer (it’s funny and
entertaining, to learn the news, it presents the news in an interesting and funny way,
it’s unbiased and truthful, it simplifies the news and makes it easier to understand,
other).
Level of measurement: Nominal
RQ2b: Is Albernameg’s audience being exposed to traditional news sources, or is
Albernameg their sole source of news?
This is measured in the questionnaire using the following question: Where do you get
the news? You can choose more than one answer. (Radio stations, Print Newspapers,
Online newspapers, Egyptian TV talk shows, Arabic news channels [such as Al
Arabeya, BBC Arabic or Al Jazeera], Foreign news channels [such as BBC and
CNN], Social media [such as Facebook and Twitter], Satire shows [such as
Albernameg], None of the above. I don’t follow the news. , other).
Level of measurement: Nominal
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RQ2c: Does the audience perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of
information?
Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the
following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5=
Strongly agree.
1. Bassem Youssef shows truthful videos without manipulation.
2. After Bassem Youssef’s plagiarism incident, I see him as untrustworthy.
(reverse coding)
3. Bassem Youssef’s courage in apologizing after his plagiarism incident makes
him credible.
4. I consider Bassem Youssef a credible source of information.
5. Albernameg is objective in its coverage of public affairs.
6. Albernameg has political inclinations. (reverse coding)
Level of measurement: Interval
H1: There is a relationship between viewing motivations and perceptions of the
AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.
H1a: Viewers who watched Albernameg for information are more likely to have
a negative perception of the virus C detection device than those who watched for
entertainment.
Independent variable: motivations for watching Albernameg
This is measured in the questionnaire using the following question: Why did you
watch Albernameg? You can choose more than one answer. (It’s funny and
entertaining, To learn the news, It presents the news in an interesting and funny way,
It’s unbiased and truthful, It simplifies the news and makes it easier to understand,
Other)
Level of measurement: Nominal
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Dependent variable: Perception of the virus C detection device
Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the
following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5=
Strongly agree.
1. The virus C detection device is one of the most important Egyptian inventions
to date.
2. The virus C detection device gives new hope for many patients.
3. The virus C detection device has nothing to do with science. (reverse coding)
H1b: Viewers who watched Albernameg for information are more likely to have
a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity than those who
watched for entertainment.
Independent variable: motivations for watching Albernameg
Level of measurement: Nominal
Dependent variable: Perception of coal introduction as an alternative source of
generating electricity in Egypt
Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the
following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5=
Strongly agree.
1. I consider coal introduction as an alternative source of generating electricity is
an effective way to solve our electricity problem.
2. Using coal to generate electricity will add to our problems due to the pollution
it will result in. (reverse coding)
3. I support the idea of introducing coal as an alternative source of generating
electricity.
4. I support the call to stop using coal. (reverse coding)
Level of measurement: Interval
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H2: There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of
the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.
H2a: Heavy viewers of Albernameg are more likely to have a negative perception
of the virus C detection device than light viewers.
Independent variable: viewership of Albernameg
This is measured in the questionnaire using the following question: How often did
you watch Albernameg? (All the time [I used to watch the episode every week],
Occasionally [one or two episodes every month], Rarely [one episode every few
months])
Level of measurement: Nominal
Dependent variable: Perception of the virus C detection device
Level of measurement: Interval
H2b: Heavy viewers of Albernameg are more likely to have a negative
perception of using coal to generate electricity than light viewers.
Independent variable: viewership of Albernameg
Level of measurement: Nominal
Dependent variable: Perception of coal introduction as an alternative source of
generating electricity in Egypt
Level of measurement: Interval
H3: There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible
source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device
and using coal to generate electricity.
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H3a: Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information
are more likely to have a negative perception of the virus C detection device.
Independent variable: perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef
Respondents are asked to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement to the
following statements on a five point Likert scale wherein 1= Strongly disagree and 5=
Strongly agree.
1. Bassem Youssef shows truthful videos without manipulation.
2. After Bassem Youssef’s plagiarism incident, I see him as untrustworthy.
(reverse coding)
3. Bassem Youssef’s courage in apologizing after his plagiarism incident makes
him more credible.
4. I consider Bassem Youssef a credible source of information.
5. Albernameg is objective in its coverage of public affairs.
6. Albernameg has political inclinations. (reverse coding)
Level of measurement: Interval
Dependent variable: Perception of the virus C detection device
Level of measurement: Interval
H3b: Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information
are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity.
Independent variable: perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef
Level of measurement: Interval
Dependent variable: Perception of coal introduction as an alternative source of
generating electricity in Egypt
Level of measurement: Interval
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CHAPTER	
  FIVE	
  
METHODOLOGY	
  
	
  
The study started with qualitative content analysis in order to choose the media
frames that were on Albernameg. These media frames formed the basis of the survey
questions to examine whether audience frames correspond to the media frames in the
show.
A.	
  	
  	
  QUALITATIVE	
  CONTENT	
  ANALYSIS
Controversial issues offer a challenge in the process of attribution of
responsibility. The media, depending on how they frame the event, can shape
attributions of responsibility for social and political issues (Iyengar, 1991).	
  	
  When
individuals are exposed to competing frames, their response will likely be one of two
alternatives. They will either respond to the louder frame or to the stronger frame. A
loud frame is the frame most frequently repeated.	
  	
  Repetition increases the
accessibility of the frame. A strong frame can be determined based on several factors
(Chong and Druckman, 2007b).	
  	
  These include values and prior beliefs (Chong and
Druckman, 2007a), source credibility (Druckman, 2001), knowledge about the issue
(Baden & Lecheler, 2012; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012;
Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997; Detenber et al, 2007)
and intensity of emotional reactions (Aarøe, 2011).	
  
Values, prior beliefs, knowledge about the issue and intensity of emotional
reactions are all related to the audience and may vary from one person to the other.
Therefore, the researcher opted to choose source credibility as the determinant of the
strong frame on which to analyze framing effects, since source credibility is an
attribute of the message itself.
In order to choose a repetitive frame and a strong frame, one that is
communicated through a credible source, the first step in the methodology was to
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conduct a qualitative content analysis of Albernameg. The media frames that were
selected would then be the basis on which the survey questions were constructed.
The main aim was to examine whether there is a correlation between the media
frames on Albernameg and the audience frames in relation to viewers’ perceptions of
the issues under analysis.
The researcher analyzed the content of the third season of the show. Since it
was the last season of the show, this meant it would be the freshest in the minds of the
audience. The analysis resulted in choosing “perception of the AIDS & virus C
detection device” as the repetitive frame, and “perception of using coal as an
alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt” as the strong frame. The AIDS
& virus C detection device was brought up in every episode since the announcement
of the device until the show went off the air, a total of seven episodes. The issue was
covered in varying degrees of intensity, sometimes covered in whole segments of the
show, or just in passing as a reminder for the audience. Using coal as an alternative
source of generating electricity was covered through interviewing an expert on the
issue, Ahmed El Derouby, coordinator of the “Egyptians against coal” movement. El
Derouby introduced himself on the show saying that he’s been working in the field of
environmental protection for nine years, he currently works in an organization that
aims to protect the environment in Egypt and has worked before in international
environmental protection organizations. The analysis also showed that both issues
were framed negatively on Albernameg.
The choice of these two issues was based on the analysis of the following episodes:
Season 3 – Episode 4 - Second segment
Bassem Youssef showed video segments of talk shows announcing that the military
spokesman revealed that the military has succeeded in inventing a device that
diagnoses AIDS & virus C without needing a blood sample from the patient. He then
makes fun of this, saying that he as a doctor is truly surprised that “someone just
points this antenna-looking device at you and discovers if you have AIDS or virus C
from a distance.” Then, he shows segments of TV presenter, Amr Adib, blaming

	
  

46

newspapers for announcing that the device can cure diseases, whereas the military
only said that it diagnoses. This is followed by talk show segments saying that the
device indeed cures AIDS & virus C, referring to its inventor, Lieutenant Abdel Atti’s
explanation of how the device works: “I take the AIDS from the patient, then I give it
back to him to feed on in the form of a sausage. I take the disease and give it back as
nutrition. And this is the epitome of scientific achievement.” Bassem Youssef
follows up on this, sarcastically commenting, “this is scientific achievement, the virus
has become a sausage!”
The official video that was released by the military was then shown. Bassem Youssef
pokes fun at it pinpointing how the narration on the video declares that the device can
diagnose diseases that may affect humans or “other creatures”, and how the device
was pointing at the doctor in the video, which meant he must be sick too. He then
referred to the name of the invention: “Completed Cure Device” (CCD). This was
followed by several video segments of talk shows discussing how the CCD can cure
all kinds of viruses, including diabetes, skin diseases and cancer. Bassem commented
on this saying that cancer isn’t a virus, and that he’s been so stunned since the
beginning of the show, that he doesn’t think anything else can stun him further. Then
videos of further explanation of how the device works indicate the extent of its
sensitivity, with a doctor explaining that “It’s so accurate that one of the patients had
said hi to me before we started, and his fingerprint was left on my jacket, so the
machine detected this fingerprint,” to which Bassem replied “I’m sorry guys I
dropped some virus on myself earlier.”
This was followed by a comic sketch similar to a detergent advertisement depicting a
housewife saying that her husband is a doctor, and always comes home with his
clothes full of virus stains, but now with Complete Cure, with the power of scientific
achievement, she beat the viruses, and his clothes are as good as new. Bassem then
adds that “it’s available in jasmine scent and sausage flavor.”
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The segment ends with video segments of talk shows saying that although the
military medical team has said that we have beaten virus C, the President’s scientific
consultant has said that this is a catastrophe for Egypt!
Season 3 – Episode 4 - Third segment
In this segment, Bassem Youssef talks seriously about the device. He says that
before announcing such a medical breakthrough, it should go through a process of
submitting a scientific research paper, publishing it and presenting it in conferences.
He points out that there is a difference between a theory, an idea, and having a
functioning cure available.
He mentions that he will not dwell on the fact that this alleged doctor owned a herbal
clinic that was shut down, or that he had a show on Al Nas TV channel, which was
also shut down. He speaks of the promise to the millions of people in Egypt and
hundreds of millions worldwide to cure them of AIDS & virus C. He refers to the
military spokesman who announced that on June 30th military hospitals would
commence mass treatment of the disease. Bassem Youssef also stresses on the fact
that this promise is bound by a time frame and that it is not vague talk about making
progress in a year or two and checking if it works, but a promise for this year. He
adds that with this promise, Egypt should see billions of dollars flow into its economy
to treat these diseases, and that we will no longer need the Suez Canal or tourism.
Bassem Youssef ends the segment by saying that before anyone goes on to accuse
him of insulting the achievement and depressing the people, they should keep their
eyes on those who promised. He says that if the promise is fulfilled, there would be
nothing more to ask and that the show would not matter in the least. However, “if the
promise that came from the largest institution in Egypt is broken on June 30th, then all
the doctors on the committee and every media person who propagated the devices
should be held accountable.” He points out that until the promise is fulfilled, he will
be reminding people of what happened, every week, until there is a worthy reaction,
adding that if anyone is hoping that the people will forget, they won’t because we will
be reminding them, in reference to Albernameg.
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Season 3 – Episode 5 – First segment
Bassem Youssef was showing a video of the TV presenter Amani El Khayat in which
she was saying that she has been called a sergeant for voicing her opinions, but that
she is not afraid of swimming against the current. Bassem Youssef followed up on
the video by saying “I take Amani El Khayat and make her swim against the current,
then return her as a policewoman and sergeant at the same time, just like AIDS and
virus C, and this is the epitome of scientific achievement.” A picture of Lieutenant
Abdel Atti, the inventor of the AIDS & virus C device was displayed beside him on
the screen as he talked.
Season 3 – Episode 6 – First segment
A counter is displayed on the screen beside Bassem Youssef, showing that it has been
14 days since the announcement of the invention. He then started talking about the
AIDS & virus C device and made fun of its inventor’s description of it as being
similar to feeding the patient sausage. He then moved on to discuss how everyone on
the media approved of the device and were attacking interim President Adly
Mansour’s scientific consultant, Dr. Essam Heggy, who came from NASA and did
not like the invention. This was followed by videos of different TV presenters
attacking Heggy for opposing the AIDS & virus C detection device. Bassem Youssef
then continued to make fun of the issue saying that Dr. Essam Heggy is mistaken
since we’ve never heard of a scientific consultant giving a scientific consultation
regarding a scientific matter!
Bassem Youssef then talked about Lieutenant Abdel Atti and his latest statement that
he was a pyramid in the midst of cockroaches. This was followed by a comic sketch,
featuring a pyramid and two people dressed as cockroaches singing a nursery rhyme
whose words had been altered to fit the issue. He then showed a video segment of
Lieutenant Abdel Atti talking to TV presenter Mostafa Bakry over the phone, saying
that his family comes from the lineage of Prophet Mohamed. Bassem Youssef then
commented, as if talking to Essam Heggy, telling him to go ahead and be an infidel
for the sake of science. He continued that it turns out he is not only doubting an
invention, but doubting a legend. He said “Abdel Atti is a lieutenant, so you’re
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doubting the army; from the lineage of the prophet, so you will be labeled an infidel;
a pyramid, so tourism workers will hate you. All that for what? Science? To hell with
science!”
Then he went back to Abdel Atti boasting with his proclaimed 100% success rate of
curing AIDS and saying that one day AIDS patients will be boasting about the fact
that they once had AIDS. This was followed by a sketch mocking Abdel Atti’s
declarations. Bassem Youssef then said that when someone comes up with a new
medicine or invention, there have to be accompanying certificates and tests run by a
specialized neutral party to verify it, not just any passerby. This was followed by
Mostafa Bakri saying that he himself asked Marshal Sisi about the device and he
swore that when he saw it his eyes overflowed with tears. Bassem then said “to hell
with certificates. We can give the device the ISO.”
Bassem Youssef moved on to say that it’s more than just an issue of a device. “It’s
about anyone who was educated abroad, well-read or speaks foreign languages.
That’s the real danger to the country. How come people travel abroad and earn
degrees, awards and Nobel prizes and then want to come back and benefit the
country?” sarcastically mocking TV presenters who referred to Baradei, Mostafa
Hegazy and others as traitors and spies. He then directed his words to the youth
telling them to stay ignorant in order to live in bliss.
Season 3 – Episode 7 – First segment
The counter is displayed on the screen beside Bassem Youssef, showing that it has
been 21 days since the announcement of the invention.
Season 3 – Episode 8 – First segment
The counter is displayed on the screen beside Bassem Youssef, showing that it has
been 28 days since the announcement of the invention.
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Season 3 – Episode 9 – Second segment
Bassem Youssef was talking about Qatar and how we should be dealing with it,
referring to Qatar as cancerous and trying to play the role of a virus. He then dwells
on the idea of cancerous cells and viruses saying that “if Qatar will give us a
headache, we have the invention, and in one second we can turn it into a sausage!”
The counter is displayed on the screen beside Bassem Youssef, showing that it has
been 35 days since the announcement of the invention.
Season 3 – Episode 10 – Second segment
Bassem Youssef started the segment by making fun of people who are against the use
of coal. He then showed videos from other talk shows discussing the benefits of
using coal. This was followed by a video of the minister of environment declaring
that the ministry of environment is against the use of coal because it would cause
various kinds of diseases. He then went back to talk show segments discussing clean
coal technology (CCT). This prompted Bassem Youssef to refer to the CCD
(complete cure device), the AIDS & virus C device. The device was mentioned in
passing, with the counter appearing on the screen indicating that it’s been 42 days
since the announcement of the invention.
He then interviewed Ahmed El Derouby, the coordinator of the “Egyptians against
coal” movement. He introduced himself saying that he’s been working for nine years
in the field of environmental protection, currently works in an organization to protect
the environment in Egypt and has worked before in international organizations
aiming to protect the environment.
El Derouby then discussed how the world is dealing with coal in generating
electricity, giving the U.S. and China as examples of major countries that use coal to
generate some of their electricity. However, both countries are currently trying to cut
back on their use of coal after experiencing the drawbacks on health that result as a
consequence. This in turn leads them to spend billions to make up for the damage to
the environment and citizens’ health. He went on to explain that research done in
Egypt estimates that Egypt will have to spend around 3.2 billion dollars per year on
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damages to health as a result of using coal, which would constitute 75% of the health
ministry’s budget.
El Derouby also added that building coal plants would take around five years. This
means that it will not solve the electricity problem, since the gas problem leading to
electricity outages is expected to end within three to four years. He then said that the
cement companies are the ones pushing for introducing coal and that they are using a
public relations country to propagate the benefits of using coal.
He finally discussed alternative solutions, using Germany as an example, explaining
that they use garbage and agricultural waste to power their cement plants. He ended
by giving the use of solar energy as an efficient solution for generating electricity,
saying that the price of generating electricity through solar energy decreased by 80%
from 2008 to 2013.
Bassem Youssef ended the segment by encouraging people to join in the movement
against coal by using the hash tag “#Stop Coal” on Twitter.
Season 3 – Episode 11 – Second segment
The counter is displayed on the screen beside Bassem Youssef, showing that it has
been 49 days since the announcement of the invention. Bassem Youssef introduced a
video of what was previously discussed about the device on Albernameg. The video
showed snap shots of Lieutenant Abdel Atti talking about the device on various
channels and TV shows. Bassem Youssef then made fun of the device, giving it
various names that resemble names of movies, such as “An invention from security
forces”, “AIDS & Dr. Nooman”, “Talk of the sausage and the evening” and “AIDS
Dabbour”.
Bassem Youssef showed segments of other TV talk shows discussing the credentials
and certification of the device’s inventor, coming to the conclusion that no one is sure
whether Abdel Atti is actually a doctor or not. He then moved to segments of
interviews with officials from the Egyptian military discussing the success and
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potential of the device. This was followed by news segments announcing that the
Egyptian health ministry will start importing a new American drug to treat virus C
patients. Then, Bassem Youssef acts confused and starts asking numerous questions
about why we need this new expensive imported drug if we already have an Egyptian
device that the military says can deliver the same results. He argues that science in
not like politics, and that propaganda will not work on such a scientific issue. He
ends the segment with a series of TV hosts calling those who second-guess the
scientific basis of the device traitors.
B.	
  	
  	
  SURVEY
The second step was designing a survey based on the frames determined
through the qualitative content analysis. The survey was administered in Arabic
language because this is the mother language of the target audience. The
questionnaire starts with a filtering question addressing the viewership of Albernameg
in order to exclude non-viewers from the sample. It included 36 questions addressing
the main variables of the study. These included the level of viewership of
Albernameg, motivations for watching the show, participants’ news sources, political
interest and attention, political knowledge, internal and external political efficacy,
perceptions of the virus C detection device and coal introduction as an alternative
source of generating electricity in Egypt, perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef,
and finally participants’ demographics.
C.	
  	
  	
  DESCRIPTION	
  OF	
  THE	
  SAMPLE
A non-probability purposive sample was used to collect the data. The
researcher opted for a purposive sample in order to ensure that only Albernameg
viewers are included in the sample. The choice of this non-probability sample type
was due to the difficulties of obtaining a probability sample in Egypt, more
specifically lack of a list of the population and the lack of a research culture that
would allow the researcher to conduct a cluster sample.
An online questionnaire was posted on Facebook and sent to friends and
family by email. They were asked to answer the questionnaire and send it to their
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friends as well in order to reach the largest possible number of participants. Since the
online questionnaire requires access to and literacy of computers, it was mainly
targeting higher socioeconomic classes. Printed questionnaires were used as well in
order to reach lower socioeconomic classes who may not have access to or literacy of
computers.
Four hundred self-administered and online questionnaires were distributed.
After excluding 78 questionnaires for answering “No” on the filtering question, the
final sample size was 322. The sample included Egyptians, 47% males and 53%
females. The educational levels of participants ranged between 45% university
degree holders, 16% having a secondary degree or an equivalent, 11% master’s
holders, 11% having a preparatory degree and the remaining 17% was between Ph.D.
holders, primary degree holders, having a certificate for illiteracy or illiterate.
Average monthly income of the family was distributed between 25% less than 1000,
28% from 1000 to 2000, 23% more than 2000 to 5000 and 24% more than 5000.
Participants’ occupations ranged between 15% students, 23% unemployed, 40%
working in the private sector, 15% working in the public sector and 7% retirees.
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CHAPTER	
  SIX	
  
DATA	
  ANALYSIS	
  
RQ1: What are the socio-political characteristics of Albernameg’s audience?
•

RQ1a: What are Albernameg audience’s demographics?

Table 1:
Age

Valid

q33) Age

Less than 18
From 18 to 25
More than 25 to 35
More than 35 to 45
More than 45 to 55
More than 55
Total

Frequency
34
96
95
39
27
31
322

Percent
10.6
29.8
29.5
12.1
8.4
9.6
100.0

Valid Percent
10.6
29.8
29.5
12.1
8.4
9.6
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
10.6
40.4
69.9
82.0
90.4
100.0

Figure	
  1:	
  Age	
  
Table 1 and figure 1 show that 29.8% of the sampled audience is between the ages of
18 to 25, 29.5% are between the ages of 26 to 35, 12% are between the ages of 36 and
45, 10.6% are less than 18 years old, 9.6% are above 55 years old and 8.4% are
between the ages of 46 to 55.
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Table 2:
Gender

Valid

Male
Female
Total

q34) Gender
Frequency
151
171
322

Percent
46.9
53.1
100.0

Valid Percent
46.9
53.1
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
46.9
100.0

Figure	
  2:	
  Gender	
  

Table 2 and figure 2 show that 47% of the sampled audience is males and 53% is
females.
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Table 3:
Educational level

Valid

Illiterate
Certificate for illiteracy
Primary
Preparatory
Secondary degree or
its equivalent
University degree
Master's degree
Doctorate (Ph.D.)
Total

q35) Educational level
Frequency
18
12
15
35

Percent
5.6
3.7
4.7
10.9

Valid Percent
5.6
3.7
4.7
10.9

Cumulative
Percent
5.6
9.3
14.0
24.8

51

15.8

15.8

40.7

145
34
12
322

45.0
10.6
3.7
100.0

45.0
10.6
3.7
100.0

85.7
96.3
100.0

Figure	
  3:	
  Educational	
  Level	
  

Table 3 and figure 3 show that 45% of the sample hold university degrees, 15.8%
have a secondary degree or its equivalent, 10.9% have a preparatory degree, 10.6%
have a master’s degree, 5.6% are illiterate, 4.7% have a primary degree, 3.7% have a
Ph.D. and 3.7% have a certificate for illiteracy.
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Table 4:
Occupation

Valid

Student
Unemployed
Private sector
Public sector
Retiree
Total

q37) Occupation
Frequency
49
75
128
48
22
322

Percent
15.2
23.3
39.8
14.9
6.8
100.0

Valid Percent
15.2
23.3
39.8
14.9
6.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
15.2
38.5
78.3
93.2
100.0

Figure	
  4:	
  Occupation	
  

Table 4 and figure 4 show that 39.8% of the sample work in the private sector,
23.3% are unemployed, 15.2% are students, 14.9% work in the public sector and
6.8% are reitrees.
To sum up, in response to RQ1a, 60% of the sampled audience is between the ages of
18 and 35, with almost equal representation of both genders (47% males and 53%
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females). Almost half the sample (45%) hold university degrees and their
occupations range between working in the private sector (40%), being unemployed
(23%) and being a student (15%) or working in the public sector (15%).

•

RQ1b: Is Albernameg’s audience interested in politics and public affairs?

Table 5:
q6) Interest
Generallyin
speaking,
are you in what is going on with politics
politicshow
andinterested
public affairs
and public affairs?

Valid

Not at all
Somewhat
Extremely
Total

Frequency
62
144
116
322

Percent
19.3
44.7
36.0
100.0

Valid Percent
19.3
44.7
36.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
19.3
64.0
100.0

Table 5 shows that 19.3% of the sample is not interested in politics at all, 44.7% is
somewhat interested and 36% is extremely interested.
•

RQ1c: Is Albernameg’s audience attentive to politics and public affairs?

Table 6:
q7) Generally speaking, how often do you pay attention to information about
Attention to politics politics
and public
affairs
and public affairs?

Valid

Never
Sometimes
Very often
Total

Frequency
66
156
100
322

Percent
20.5
48.4
31.1
100.0

Valid Percent
20.5
48.4
31.1
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
20.5
68.9
100.0

Table 6 shows that 20.5% of the sample never pays attention to politics, 48.4%
sometimes pay attention and 31.1% very often pay attention.
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Table 7:
Political interest and attention
Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Low

74

23.0

23.0

Medium

124

38.5

38.5

High

124

38.5

38.5

Total

322

100.0

100.0

Low	
  
Medium	
  
High	
  

Figure	
  5:	
  Political	
  Interest	
  and	
  Attention	
  

Since there was no big difference between measures of political interest and measures
of political attention, they were both combined into one measure. Table 7 and figure
5 show that political interest and attention among Albernameg’s audience ranges
between high (38.5%) and medium (38.5%).
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•

RQ1d: Is Albernameg’s audience politically knowledgeable?

Table 8:
Political knowledge

Frequency
Valid

low

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

55

17.1

17.1

17.1

medium

142

44.1

44.1

61.2

high

125

38.8

38.8

100.0

Total

322

100.0

100.0

Low	
  
Medium	
  
High	
  	
  

Figure	
  6:	
  Political	
  Knowledge	
  

Table 8 and figure 6 show that the level of political knowledge among the surveyed
sample was 17% low, 44% medium and 39% high.
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•

RQ1e: Do Albernameg audience have internal and external political
efficacy?

Table 9:
Internal Political Efficacy
N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Internal Political Efficacy

322

2.7811

.79610

The table shows that the audience has low internal political efficacy since the mean
score is less than 3 (mean= 2.78).
Table 10:
External Political Efficacy
N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

External Political Efficacy

322

3.4648

1.04567

The table shows that the audience has neutral towards high external political efficacy
since the mean score is slightly above 3 (mean= 3.5).

In summary, in response to RQ1, the socio-political characteristics of Albernameg’s
audience include their gender being equally distributed between males and females,
with their ages ranging between 18 and 35. Most audience members are university
degree holders who primarily work in the private sector or are unemployed, with a
smaller percentage being students or working in the public sector. The level of
political interest and attention among the audience ranges between medium (38.5%)
and high (38.5%), with the level of political knowledge ranging between medium
(44%) and high (39%). The audience exhibits low levels of internal political efficacy
(mean= 2.78) and neutral leaning towards slightly high levels of external political
efficacy (mean= 3.5).
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RQ2: What are Albernameg audience’s motivations for watching the show?

•

RQ2a: Does the audience consider Albernameg a source of news?

Table 11:
Reasons for watching Albernameg
Frequency

Percent

Rank

It’s funny and entertaining

151

46.9

1

It presents the news in an interesting and
funny way

100

31.1

2

To learn the news

82

25.5

3

It’s unbiased and truthful

44

13.7

4

It simplifies the news and makes it easier to
understand

26

8.1

5

Figure	
  7:	
  Reasons for watching Albernameg
	
  
Table 11 and figure 7 show that the highest ranking reason for the audience to watch
Albernameg is because it is funny and entertaining (46.9%), followed by because it
presents the news in an interesting and funny way (31.1%), to learn the news ranked
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third (25.5%), because it’s unbiased and truthful ranked fourth (13.7%) and finally
because it simplifies the news and makes it easier to understand ranking fifth (8.1%).
This means that in response to RQ2a, whether the audience considers Albernameg a
source of news, 56.6% of the audience considers it a source of news. This is the sum
of the respondents who chose that they watched the show because it presents the
news in an interesting and funny way (31.1%) and those who chose that they watched
it to learn the news (25.5%). These two reasons ranked second and third, after
watching the show because it’s funny and entertaining, which ranked first (46.9%).

•

RQ2b: Is Albernameg’s audience being exposed to traditional news sources,
or is Albernameg their sole source of news?

Table 12:
News sources

	
  

Frequency

Percent

Rank

Radio stations

56

17.4

4

Print newspapers

69

21.4

2

Online newspapers

83

25.8

1

Egyptian TV talk shows

64

19.9

3

Arabic news channels (such as Al Arabiya,
BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera)

56

17.4

4

Foreign news channels (such as BBC and
CNN)

20

6.2

6

Social media (such as Facebook and
Twitter)

44

13.7

5

Satire shows (such as Albernameg)

19

5.9

7

None of the above. I don’t follow the news.

13

4.0

8

64

30"

Radio"Stations"

25"

Print"Newspapers"

Online"Newspapers"
20"

Egyptian"TV"Talk"
Shows"
15"

10"

Arabic"News"
Channels"(e.g."Al"
Arabiya,"BBC"Arabic"
&"Al"Jazeera)"
Foreign"News"
Channels"(such"as"
BBC"&"CNN)"
Social"Media"(such"
as"Facebook"&"
Twitter)"

5"

Satire"Shows"(such"
as"Albernameg)"

0"

Figure	
  8:	
  News Sources
Table 12 and figure 8 show that the audience’s news sources rank as follows: online
newspapers rank first (25.8%), print newspapers rank second (21.4%), Egyptian TV
talk shows rank third (19.9%), radio stations and Arabic news channels (such as Al
Arabiya, BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera) both rank fourth (17.4%), social media (such as
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Facebook and Twitter) rank fifth (13.7%), foreign news channels (such as BBC and
CNN) rank sixth (6.2%) and satire shows (such as Albernameg) rank seventh (5.9%).
This means that in response to RQ2b, Albernameg’s audience is being exposed to
traditional news sources, with the top ranking sources being online newspapers, print
newspapers and Egyptian TV talk shows.

•

RQ2c: Does the audience perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of
information?

Table 13:
Credibility of Bassem Youssef
Credibility of Bassem
Youssef

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

322

3.1087

.76591

The table shows that the credibility of Bassem Youssef is towards neutral with a
mean score of 3.1.
In summary, this shows that in response to RQ2, the audience’s highest ranking
motivations for watching the Albernameg include that they watch it because it’s
funny and entertaining (46.9%). Also, 56.6% of the audience considers it a source of
news; between watching it because it presents the news in an interesting and funny
way (31.1%) and watching it purely to learn the news (25.5%). Albernameg’s
audience is being exposed to traditional news sources, with the top ranking sources
being online newspapers (25.8%), print newspapers (21.4%) and Egyptian TV talk
shows (19.9%). However, Bassem Youssef’s credibility as a source of information
did not prove to be a significant factor behind watching the show since his credibility
was towards neutral, with a mean score of 3.1.
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H1: There is a relationship between viewing motivations and perceptions of the
AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.
The motivations for watching the show were measured using a multiple response
question (i.e. respondents could choose more than one answer). So, in the analysis,
motivations are measured on the highest ranking answers, which also represent the
two main motivations the hypothesis is testing: watching for entertainment (with the
response on the question being: “I used to watch Albernameg because it’s funny and
entertaining”) and watching for information (with the response on the question being:
“I used to watch Albernameg because it presents the news in an interesting and funny
way”, and “to learn the news” combined).

•

H1a: Viewers who watched Albernameg for information are more likely to
have a negative perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device than
those who watched for entertainment.

Table 14: Mean scores of watching for information and watching for
entertainment in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device
motivations

	
  

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Perception

Ent.

151

2.7572

1.04416

.08497

of device

Info.

124

2.7419

1.01732

.09136

67

Table 15: Difference between watching for information and watching for
entertainment in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval of

	
  

F
ind15_18

Sig.

t

df

Sig. (2-

Mean

Std. Error

tailed)

Difference

Difference

the Difference
Lower

Upper

Equal variances
.272

.602

.122

273

.903

.01524

.12509

-.23102-

.26150

.122

265.149

.903

.01524

.12477

-.23042-

.26090

assumed
Equal variances not

	
  

	
  

assumed

Table 14 shows that viewers who watched Albernameg for entertainment and those
who watched for information both have negative perceptions of the AIDS & virus C
detection device, with their mean scores being 2.76 and 2.74 respectively. Table 15
shows that there is no significant difference between perceptions of viewers who
watched for entertainment and those who watched for information, with the
significance level being 0.903. This indicates that H1a is rejected.

•

H1b: Viewers who watched Albernameg for information are more likely to
have a negative perception of using coal to generate electricity than those
who watched for entertainment.

Table 16: Mean scores of watching for information and watching for
entertainment in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity
motivations
Using coal

	
  

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Ent.

151

2.5497

.90001

.07324

Info.

124

2.6976

.83147

.07467

68

Table 17: Difference between watching for information and watching for
entertainment in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval of

	
  

F
Ind19_22

Sig.

t

df

Sig. (2-

Mean

Std. Error

tailed)

Difference

Difference

the Difference
Lower

Upper

Equal variances
.625

.430

-1.403-

273

.162

-.14791-

.10541

-.35543-

.05961

-1.414-

269.203

.158

-.14791-

.10459

-.35384-

.05801

assumed
Equal variances not

	
  

	
  

assumed

Table 16 shows that viewers who watched Albernameg for entertainment and those
who watched for information both have negative perceptions of using coal to generate
electricity, with their mean scores being 2.5 and 2.7 respectively. Table 17 shows
that there is no significant difference between perceptions of viewers who watched
for entertainment and those who watched for information, with the significance level
being 0.162. This indicates that H1b is rejected.
According to the results of H1a and H1b, this concludes that H1 is rejected. There is
no significant difference between viewers who watched Albernameg for
entertainment and those who watched for information. Both groups have negative
perceptions in relation to both issues under investigation, perceptions of the AIDS &
virus C detection device, and using coal to generate electricity.
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H2: There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of
the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity.

•

H2a: Heavy viewers of Albernameg are more likely to have a negative
perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device than light viewers.

Table 18: Mean scores of level of viewership in terms of perception of the AIDS
& virus C detection device
t15_18-Perception of
q2) How often did you watch Al Bernameg?
Rarely (one episode every few

Mean

months)

N

device
3.1933
50

Std. Deviation
Occasionally (one or two episodes

Mean

every month)

N

1.10059
2.6989
124

Std. Deviation

.94894

All the time (I used to watch the

Mean

2.5698

episode every week)

N

148

Std. Deviation
Total

1.03034

Mean

2.7164

N

322

Std. Deviation

1.03032

Table 19: Significance between different levels of viewership in terms of
perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares

	
  
t15_18-Perception Between
of device
Groups
Within
Groups
Total

	
  

Mean
Square

df

14.591

2

326.169

319

340.761

321 	
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F

7.296

Sig.

7.135

.001

1.022 	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Table 20: Difference between levels of viewership in terms of perception of the
AIDS & virus C detection device
95% Confidence Interval

(I) q2) How often did

(J) q2) How often did

you watch Al

you watch Al

Difference (I-

Std.

Dependent Variable

Bernameg?

Bernameg?

J)

Error

t15_18-Perception of

Rarely (one episode

Occasionally (one or

the virus C detection

every few months)

two episodes every

device

Mean

Sig.

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

.49441

*

.16940

.004

.1611

.8277

.62351

*

.16540

.000

.2981

.9489

-.49441-

*

.16940

.004

-.8277-

-.1611-

.12910

.12310

.295

-.1131-

.3713

*

.16540

.000

-.9489-

-.2981-

-.12910-

.12310

.295

-.3713-

.1131

month)
All the time (I used to
watch the episode
every week)
Occasionally (one or

Rarely (one episode

two episodes every

every few months)

month)

All the time (I used to
watch the episode
every week)

All the time (I used to

Rarely (one episode

watch the episode

every few months)

every week)

Occasionally (one or

-.62351-

two episodes every
month)

Table 18 shows that light viewers of Albernameg who rarely watched the show,
watching an episode every few months, have a neutral leaning towards positive
perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device (mean= 3.2). Moderate viewers,
who occasionally watched the show, watching one or two episodes every month, have
a negative perception of the device (mean= 2.7). Heavy viewers, those who watched
the show every week, had a slightly more negative perception than moderate viewers
(mean= 2.6).
Table 19 shows that there is a significant difference between different levels of
viewership in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device, with a
significance level of 0.001. Table 20 indicates that the significant differences in
perception of the device are between light and moderate viewers (p= 0.004), and
between light and heavy viewers (p= 0.000). However, there is no significant
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difference between heavy and moderate viewers (p= 0.295). This indicates that H2a
is accepted.

•

H2b: Heavy viewers of Albernameg are more likely to have a negative
perception of using coal to generate electricity than light viewers.

Table 21: Mean scores of level of viewership in terms of perception of using coal
to generate electricity
t19_22-Perception of
using coal to
q2) How often did you watch Al Bernameg?
Rarely (one episode every few

Mean

months)

N

generate electricity
2.7500
50

Std. Deviation

.82839

Occasionally (one or two episodes

Mean

2.7359

every month)

N

124

Std. Deviation

.75594

All the time (I used to watch the

Mean

2.4358

episode every week)

N

Total

148

Std. Deviation

.95392

Mean

2.6002

N

322

Std. Deviation

.87378

Table 22: Significance between different levels of viewership in terms of
perception of using coal to generate electricity
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares

	
  
t19_22-Perception Between
of using coal to
Groups
generate electricity Within
Groups
Total

	
  

Mean
Square

df

7.404

2

237.678

319

245.082

321 	
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F

3.702

Sig.

4.969

.007

.745 	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Table 23: Difference between levels of viewership in terms of using coal to
generate electricity
95% Confidence Interval

(I) q2) How often did

(J) q2) How often did

you watch Al

you watch Al

Difference (I-

Std.

Dependent Variable

Bernameg?

Bernameg?

J)

Error

t19_22-Perception of

Rarely (one episode

Occasionally (one or

using coal to generate

every few months)

two episodes every

.01411

.14460

.922

-.2704-

.2986

*

.14119

.027

.0364

.5920

-.01411-

.14460

.922

-.2986-

.2704

.30008

*

.10509

.005

.0933

.5068

-.31419-

*

.14119

.027

-.5920-

-.0364-

-.30008-

*

.10509

.005

-.5068-

-.0933-

electricity

Mean

Sig.

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

month)
All the time (I used to
watch the episode

.31419

every week)
Occasionally (one or

Rarely (one episode

two episodes every

every few months)

month)

All the time (I used to
watch the episode
every week)

All the time (I used to

Rarely (one episode

watch the episode

every few months)

every week)

Occasionally (one or
two episodes every
month)

Table 21 shows that light, moderate and heavy viewers of Albernameg all have
negative perception in terms of perception of using coal as an alternative source of
generating electricity. Higher levels of viewership lead to a slightly more negative
perception of the issue. This is reflected in the mean scores of light, moderate and
heavy viewers. The mean score of light viewers is 2.75, the mean score of moderate
viewers is 2.74, and the mean score of heavy viewers is 2.44.
Table 22 shows that there is a significant difference between different levels of
viewership in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity, with a
significance level of 0.007. Table 23 indicates that the significant differences in
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perception of using coal as an alternative source of electricity are between light and
heavy viewers (p= 0.027), and between moderate and heavy viewers (p= 0.005).
However, there is no significant difference between light and moderate viewers (p=
0.922). This indicates that H2b is accepted.
According to the results of H2a and H2b, this concludes that H2 is accepted. There is
a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C
detection device, and using coal to generate electricity. The higher the level of
viewership, the more negative the perceptions of both issues. There are significant
differences between light, moderate and heavy viewers of Albernameg in terms of
their perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device (p= 0.001), and using coal
to generate electricity (p= 0.007).
H3: There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible
source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device
and using coal to generate electricity.
Table 24: Correlations between perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection
device and using coal to generate electricity, and perceived credibility of Bassem
Youssef
Correlations
t19_22-

	
  
t15_18-Perception of the

Pearson Correlation

virus C detection device

Sig. (2-tailed)

Perception of

t23_28-

Perception of

using coal to

Credibility of

the virus C

generate

Bassem

detection device

electricity

1

Youssef

.345

	
  

N

	
  

t15_18-

**

-.308-

**

.000

.000

322

322

322

**

1

.345

Pearson Correlation

coal to generate electricity

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

322

322

322

**

**

1

	
  

.000

t23_28-Credibility of

Pearson Correlation

Bassem Youssef

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

N

322

322
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-.308-

-.252-

**

t19_22-Perception of using

-.252-

	
  
322

•

H3a: Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of
information are more likely to have a negative perception of the AIDS &
virus C detection device.

Table 25: Mean scores of viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible and
those who do not, in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device
credibility

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

t15_18-Perception of the

low

126

2.9894

.97519

.08688

virus C detection device

high

112

2.4911

1.07008

.10111

Table 26: Difference between viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible
and those who do not, in terms of perception of the AIDS & virus C detection
device
Independent Samples Test

Levene's Test for Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means

95% Confidence Interval of the

	
  

F

t15_18-Perception of the

Equal variances assumed

virus C detection device

Equal variances not

Sig.

1.459

	
  

t

.228

	
  

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean

Std. Error

Difference

Difference

Difference

Lower

3.759

236

.000

.49835

.13258

.23715

.75954

3.738

226.006

.000

.49835

.13331

.23566

.76103

assumed

Table 24 shows that there is a weak inverse correlation between perception of the
AIDS & virus C detection device and perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef, with a
significance level of 0.000 and correlation value of -0.308. This means that the more
viewers perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information, the more
negative their perception of the AIDS & virus C device. Table 25 shows that viewers
who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information have a negative
perception of the device (mean= 2.5), whereas those who perceive him as a low
credibility source have a neutral perception of the device (mean= 3). Table 26 shows
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Upper

that there is a significant difference between viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef
as a credible source of information and those who do not, with a significance level of
0.000. This indicates that H3a is supported.

•

H3b: Viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of
information are more likely to have a negative perception of using coal to
generate electricity.

Table 27: Mean scores of viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible and
those who do not, in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity
credibility

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

t19_22-Perception of using

low

126

2.7520

.78962

.07034

coal to generate electricity

high

112

2.4888

.93505

.08835

Table 28: Difference between viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as credible
and those who do not, in terms of perception of using coal to generate electricity
Independent Samples Test

Levene's Test for Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means

95% Confidence Interval of the

	
  

F

t19_22-Perception of

Equal variances assumed

using coal to generate

Equal variances not

electricity

assumed

Sig.

5.112

	
  

t

.025

	
  

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean

Std. Error

Difference

Difference

Difference

Lower

2.353

236

.019

.26314

.11183

.04284

.48345

2.330

218.398

.021

.26314

.11294

.04056

.48573

Table 24 shows that there is a weak inverse correlation between perception of using
coal to generate electricity and perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef, with a
significance level of 0.000 and correlation value of -0.252. This means that the more
viewers perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information, the more
negative their perception of the use of coal as an alternative source of generating
electricity. Table 27 shows that viewers who do not perceive Bassem Youssef as a
credible source of information have a negative perception of the use of coal (mean=
2.75), and those who perceive him as a credible source have a slightly more negative
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Upper

perception of the use of coal (mean= 2.5). Table 28 shows that there is a significant
difference between viewers who perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible source of
information and those who do not, with a significance level of 0.019. This indicates
that H3b is supported.
Since H3a and H3b are both accepted, this concludes that H3 is accepted. There is a
relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of
information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device, and using coal
to generate electricity. Results indicate that there is a weak inverse correlation
between perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef and viewers’ perceptions of both
issues. This means that the more viewers perceive Bassem Youssef as a credible
source, the more negative their perceptions of the two issues.
POLITICAL	
  KNOWLEDGE	
  &	
  AUDIENCES’	
  PERCEPTIONS	
  
Table 29: Mean scores of different political knowledge levels in terms of
perception of the AIDS & virus C device
Political knowledge
low

t15_18-Perception of device

Mean

3.0848

N

55

Std. Deviation
medium

1.00864

Mean

2.7676

N

high

142

Std. Deviation

.93693

Mean

2.4960

N

125

Std. Deviation
Total

1.09300

Mean

2.7164

N

322

Std. Deviation

	
  

1.03032
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Table 30: Significance between different political knowledge levels in terms of
perception of the AIDS & virus C device

ANOVA
Sum of
Squares

	
  
t15_18-Perception Between
of device
Groups
Within
Groups
Total

Mean
Square

df

13.911

2

326.850

319

340.761

321 	
  

F

6.955

Sig.

6.788

.001

1.025 	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Table 31: Difference between political knowledge levels in terms of perception of
the AIDS & virus C device
95% Confidence Interval

Mean
(J)

Difference (I-

Std.
Error

Upper

Bound

Bound

Dependent Variable

(I) politicalknw politicalknw

J)

t15_18-Perception of

low

.31724

*

.16076

.049

.0010

.6335

.58885

*

.16379

.000

.2666

.9111

-.31724-

*

.16076

.049

-.6335-

-.0010-

.27161

*

.12415

.029

.0274

.5159

-.58885-

*

.16379

.000

-.9111-

-.2666-

-.27161-

*

.12415

.029

-.5159-

-.0274-

device

medium
high

medium

low
high

high

low
medium

Sig.

Lower

Table 29 shows that viewers who exhibit low levels of political knowledge have a
neutral leaning towards a slightly positive perception of the AIDS & virus C detection
device (mean= 3.1), viewers with medium levels of political knowledge have a
negative perception of the device (mean= 2.8), and those who exhibit high levels of
political knowledge have the most negative perception of the device (mean= 2.5).
Table 30 shows that there are significant differences between the perceptions of those
who exhibit low, medium and high levels of political knowledge, with a significance
level of 0.001. Table 31 shows that the difference is significant between all three
groups, between the low and the medium (p= 0.049), between the low and the high
(p= 0.000), and between the medium and the high (p=0.29).
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These results indicate that there is a significant relationship between level of political
knowledge and perception of the AIDS & virus C device. The mean scores show that
the higher the level of political knowledge the audience exhibit, the more negative
their perception of the device.
Table 32: Mean scores of different political knowledge levels in terms of
perception of using coal to generate electricity
t19_22-Perception of using
Political knowledge
low

coal to generate electricity

Mean

2.9455

N

medium

55

Std. Deviation

.68498

Mean

2.7570

N

high

142

Std. Deviation

.78604

Mean

2.2700

N

Total

125

Std. Deviation

.93735

Mean

2.6002

N

322

Std. Deviation

.87378

Table 33: Significance between different political knowledge levels in terms of
perception of using coal to generate electricity

ANOVA
Sum of
Squares

	
  
t19_22-Perception Between
of using coal to
Groups
generate electricity Within
Groups
Total

	
  

Mean
Square

df

23.678

2

221.404

319

245.082

321 	
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F

Sig.

11.839 17.058

.000

.694 	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Table 34: Difference between political knowledge levels in terms of perception of
using coal to generate electricity
95% Confidence Interval

Mean
(J)
Dependent Variable

(I) politicalknw politicalknw

t19_22-Perception of

low

using coal to generate
electricity

medium

Difference (I-

Std.

J)

Error

medium

Upper

Bound

Bound

.18841

.13231

.155

-.0719-

.4487

high

.67545

*

.13480

.000

.4102

.9407

low

-.18841-

.13231

.155

-.4487-

.0719

.48704

*

.10218

.000

.2860

.6881

-.67545-

*

.13480

.000

-.9407-

-.4102-

-.48704-

*

.10218

.000

-.6881-

-.2860-

high
high

Sig.

Lower

low
medium

Table 32 shows that viewers who exhibit low levels of political knowledge have a
neutral perception of using coal to generate electricity (mean= 3), viewers with
medium levels of political knowledge have a negative perception of the use of coal
(mean= 2.8), and those who exhibit high levels of political knowledge have the most
negative perception of the issue (mean= 2.3). Table 33 shows that there are
significant differences between the perceptions of those who exhibit low, medium
and high levels of political knowledge, with a significance level of 0.000. Table 34
shows that the difference is significant between the low and the high (p= 0.000), and
between the medium and the high (p= 0.000). There is no significant difference
between the low and the medium (p= 0.155).
These results indicate that there is a significant relationship between level of political
knowledge and perception of using coal as an alternative source of generating
electricity. The mean scores show that the higher the level of political knowledge the
audience exhibit, the more negative their perception of the use of coal.
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Table 35: Mean scores of different political knowledge levels in relation to
perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef
t23_28-Credibility of Bassem
Political knowledge
low

Youssef

Mean

2.8788

N

medium

55

Std. Deviation

.73734

Mean

3.1843

N

high

142

Std. Deviation

.65133

Mean

3.1240

N

Total

125

Std. Deviation

.87705

Mean

3.1087

N

322

Std. Deviation

.76591

Table 36: Significance between different political knowledge levels in relation to
perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares

	
  
t23_28-Credibility
of Bassem
Youssef

	
  

Between
Groups
Within
Groups
Total

Mean
Square

df

3.748

2

184.559

319

188.307

321 	
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F

1.874

Sig.

3.239

.041

.579 	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Table 37: Difference between political knowledge levels in relation to perceived
credibility of Bassem Youssef
95% Confidence Interval

Mean
(J)
Dependent Variable

(I) politicalknw politicalknw

t23_28-Credibility of

low

Bassem Youssef

high

Std.

J)

Error

Sig.

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

-.30548-

*

.12080

.012

-.5432-

-.0678-

-.24521-

*

.12308

.047

-.4874-

-.0031-

low

.30548

*

.12080

.012

.0678

.5432

high

.06027

.09329

.519

-.1233-

.2438

low

.24521

*

.12308

.047

.0031

.4874

-.06027-

.09329

.519

-.2438-

.1233

medium
high

medium

Difference (I-

medium

Table 35 shows that viewers who exhibit low levels of political knowledge have a
negative leaning towards neutral perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source
of information (mean= 2.9), viewers with medium levels of political knowledge have
a neutral slightly leaning towards positive perception of Bassem Youssef’s credibility
(mean= 3.2), and those who exhibit high levels of political knowledge also have a
neutral slightly leaning towards positive perception of Bassem Youssef’s credibility
(mean= 3.1). Table 36 shows that there are significant differences between the
perceptions of those who exhibit low, medium and high levels of political knowledge,
with a significance level of 0.041. Table 37 shows that the difference is significant
between the low and the medium (p= 0.012), and between the low and the high (p=
0.047). There is no significant difference between the medium and the high (p=
0.519).
These results indicate that there is a significant relationship between level of political
knowledge and perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef. The mean scores show that
more politically knowledgeable viewers are slightly more likely than less politically
knowledgeable ones to have a neutral leaning towards positive perception of Bassem
Youssef as a credible source of information.
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CHAPTER	
  SEVEN	
  
CONCLUSION	
  &	
  DISCUSSION	
  
The study set out to investigate the audience characteristics of the Egyptian
political satire show Albernameg, in terms of demographics and political traits. It
also examined the audience’s motivations for watching the show, particularly
focusing on information-motivated and entertainment-motivated consumption, as
well as whether the audience consider Albernameg a source of news and perceive its
presenter, Bassem Youssef, as a credible source of information. These uses and
gratifications-related concepts were then taken a step further to explore whether they
relate to the presence of framing effects for the show on its audience, or lack thereof.
Hence, this study plays an important role in bridging the gap between Uses and
Gratifications research and media effects studies.
Albernameg was chosen for research due to the literature on political satire
being largely based on Western shows in the genre, leaving out a gap in literature
about political satire when it comes to its uses and effects in a Middle Eastern context.
This particular show was selected due to its soaring popularity, as well as the
vigorous controversy that encircled it throughout its operation and after its suspension.
The suspension of the show raised even more questions about its role in influencing
and shaping Egyptian public opinion.
This study sought to inspect the following research questions in relation to
Bassem Youssef’s show Albernameg: (RQ1) What are the socio-political
characteristics of Albernameg audience? The sociopolitical characteristics of the
audience were examined in terms of demographics, interest and attention to politics
and public affairs, political knowledge and political efficacy. (RQ2) What are
Albernameg audience’s motivations for watching the show? The concepts considered
under the second research question included whether the audience considers
Albernameg a source of news, their exposure to other traditional news sources, or
lack thereof, and their perceptions of Bassem Youssef’s credibility as a source of
information.
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The study also posited three main hypotheses testing framing effects with
regards to two issues, one related to frame repetition and the other to frame strength.
(H1) There is a relationship between viewing motivations and perceptions of the
AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate electricity. Viewing
motivations under investigation were watching for information versus watching for
entertainment. (H2) There is a relationship between the level of viewership and
perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device and using coal to generate
electricity. (H3) There is a relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a
credible source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection
device and using coal to generate electricity.
The methodology started out with qualitative content analysis of the final
season of Albernameg’s episodes in order to determine the media frames, which were
then used as a basis for the rest of the study. According to Iyengar (1991), the media
can shape attributions of responsibility for social and political issues depending on
how they frame the event. Moreover, Chong and Druckman (2007b) argue that when
individuals are exposed to competing frames, they will either respond to the louder
frame or to the stronger frame. A loud frame being the frame most frequently
repeated and a strong frame is a frame communicated via a credible source and/or
conforms to strongly held beliefs. The analysis resulted in choosing “perception of
the AIDS & virus C detection device” as the repetitive frame, and “perception of
using coal as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt” as the strong
frame. The AIDS & virus C detection device was brought up in every episode since
the announcement of the device until the show went off the air, a total of seven
episodes. Using coal as an alternative source of generating electricity was covered
through interviewing an expert on the issue, Ahmed El Derouby, coordinator of the
“Egyptians against coal” movement. The analysis also showed that both issues were
framed negatively on Albernameg. These media frames were then used as a basis for
the survey questions. A non-probability purposive sample was used to collect the
data.	
  	
  Four hundred self-administered and online questionnaires were distributed. The
final sample size was 322. 	
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The main findings were discussed in details, using tables and charts, in the
data analysis chapter. This section synthesizes the results and relates them to the
theoretical framework and previous studies.
Data analysis showed that Albernameg’s audience consists mainly of youth
between the ages of 18 to 35, of both genders, with the majority being university
degree holders. They are politically interested and attentive, with levels of political
knowledge ranging between medium and high. The ages of Albernameg’s audience
falling between 18 and 35 corresponds to Lee’s (2013) study which argues that
political satire consumption is primarily linked to entertainment-driven motivations,
with younger adults being more likely than older adults to consume news for
entertainment reasons. The characteristics of the audience being highly educated
youth correspond to the flexible mentality expected for an audience of a satire show,
such as Albernameg. These results are consistent with Borden and Tew (2007) who
maintain that satire demonstrates how the same “facts” can be understood and
contextualized differently, as well as Meddaugh (2010) who says that satire involves
its audiences in observing the deficiencies inherent in media and politics, “through
participation rather than instruction.” Higher levels of education prompt a mindset
that is capable of accepting different contextualization, and participation in evaluating
issues and how they are presented in the media, rather than taking them at face value
and accepting them as undisputable facts. Moreover, the medium towards high levels
of political knowledge agree with Young (2013) whose study suggests that audiences
who avoid watching satire are low on political knowledge, so they do not have the
necessary knowledge to understand the jokes on the show.
The audience exhibits low levels of internal political efficacy (mean= 2.78)
and neutral leaning towards slightly high levels of external political efficacy (mean=
3.5). The low levels of internal political efficacy correspond to Baumgartner &
Morris’s (2008) study, which argues that some satire shows, such as The Colbert
Report, leave its young viewers less confident in their capability to comprehend
politics as a result of confusion between the show’s implicit and explicit messages.
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Moreover, given the Egyptian context the study is held in, the low levels of internal
political efficacy, reflecting the lack of participants’ confidence to participate in and
influence politics, is understandable. Many Egyptians participated in voting and
elections for the first time in their lives after the 2011 revolution. They have also
been experiencing shifting political systems since the revolution and have been
through various elections whose results have not always led to clear and concrete
outcomes. This may be the reason behind their low confidence in their ability to
contribute to and have a say in the political system.
The higher levels of external political efficacy may be reflective of Egyptians’
faith in and trustworthiness of the new government under President Sisi, with a 96%
win in the presidential elections, hoping that this regime will be more effective and
responsive than previous regimes. This is in line with the different results studies
have found when it comes to the levels of political efficacy satire audiences exhibit,
with viewers of some shows exhibiting high levels of political efficacy, whereas
others exhibit low levels (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baumgartner & Morris,
2008; Hoffman and Thomson, 2009; Hoffman & Young, 2011). This emphasizes the
idea that effects of political satire are not universal among all the shows within the
genre.
The audience’s highest-ranking motivation for watching Albernameg is
entertainment, because the show is funny. Watching for information ranked second,
between watching the show because it presents the news in an interesting and funny
way and watching it purely to learn the news. The information-related motivations
combined lead to 56.6% of the audience considering Albernameg a source of news.
The more than 50% information-motivated consumption of Albernameg contradicts
with Lee (2013) whose study suggests that political satire is linked to entertainment
and opinion-driven motivations, whereas audiences with information-driven
motivations are least motivated to watch them. Nevertheless, these findings are in
agreement with Young (2013) and So (2012) who suggest that satire audiences are
expected to consume these shows with mixed motivation of surveillance and
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enjoyment, and that audiences who watch for humor, also report watching to learn the
news, suggesting that laughter and learning may occur simultaneously.
Moreover, Albernameg is not the sole source of news for its audience. They
are being exposed to traditional news sources as well, with the top ranking sources
being online newspapers, print newspapers and Egyptian TV talk shows. This agrees
with Young and Tisinger (2006) who contend that late-night comedy viewers do not
exclusively depend on satire for information about politics and public affairs; they
watch both late-night comedy as well as traditional news.
There is no significant difference between viewers who watched Albernameg
for entertainment and those who watched for information in terms of their perceptions
of the AIDS & virus C detection device, and using coal to generate electricity. Both
groups have negative perceptions in relation to both issues. However, since in both
cases audiences’ perceptions of the two issues were negative, which is in line with
how these two issues were framed on Albernameg, this may suggest strong framing
effects regardless of the viewer’s motivation for watching the show. If both,
audiences who tune in for information and those who tune in for entertainment,
exhibit audience frames corresponding to the media frames portrayed on Albernameg,
this could lead to the conclusion that audiences do not have to be consciously aware
of and actively engaging in a learning process during watching satire. The two
processes of laughter and learning may be occurring simultaneously (Young, 2013),
with the audience consuming satire with mixed motivation of surveillance and
enjoyment (S0, 2012).
There is a relationship between the level of viewership and perceptions of the
AIDS & virus C detection device, and the use of coal to generate electricity. There
are significant differences between light, moderate and heavy viewers of Albernameg
in terms of their perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection device (p= 0.001), and
using coal to generate electricity (p= 0.007). On both issues, heavy viewers were
more likely to exhibit more negative perceptions than light viewers. This suggests
that heavy viewers of Albernameg exhibit stronger framing effects than light viewers.
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This agrees with the existing literature, which suggests that people’s opinions are
determined based on the information they hear regularly and thus most readily comes
to mind and is easily retrievable from memory. In addition, competitive news
framing is strongly influenced by recency effects with the latest frame exposure being
decisive for opinion formation (Iyengar, 1991; Chong and Druckman, 2007b).
There is a significant relationship between perception of Bassem Youssef as a
credible source of information and perceptions of the AIDS & virus C detection
device, and using coal to generate electricity. Results indicate that there is a weak
inverse correlation between perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef and viewers’
perceptions of both issues. This means that the more viewers perceive Bassem
Youssef as a credible source, the more negative their perceptions of the two issues.
This suggests that the higher the perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef as a source
of information, the stronger the framing effects for both repetitive and strong frames.
This concurs with Druckman (2001) who indicates that source credibility is a prerequisite and moderator of framing effects.
The findings of the study also pose political knowledge as a strong moderator of
framing effects. Results indicate that there is a significant relationship between level
of political knowledge and perception of the AIDS & virus C device, perception of
using coal to generate electricity, and perceived credibility of Bassem Youssef. The
higher the level of political knowledge, the more negative the perception of both the
repetitive and the strong frames under consideration in the study, and the more
positive the perception of Bassem Youssef as a credible source of information. These
results agree with Lecheler and de Vreese’s (2013) study on the effects of repetitive
and competitive news framing over time, which showed that participants with a
higher level of political knowledge exhibited greater accumulation of framing effects
and weaker recency effects (Lecheler & de Vresse, 2013). The results also agree with
Young (2004) and Young & Tisinger (2006) who argue that different audience
characteristics, such as varying political affiliations and levels of political knowledge,
may result in varying effects on viewers, even with exposure to the same show.
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Overall, the findings of the study indicate that Albernameg’s effects on its
audience differ according to audience characteristics. However, the results show that
for a large portion of the sample, Albernameg is considered a source of news. Strong
correlations between the media frames on the show and audience frames suggest the
presence of framing effects regarding perceptions of the two issues under
consideration in the study. This places Albernameg as a possible force in shaping
Egyptian public opinion and sheds light on the important role that political satire can
play in shaping audiences’ perceptions of current issues.
In light of this study, the researcher expects the satire genre to flourish in
Egypt and the Arab region. The results of the study suggest that it has a significant
impact on its audience. This is reflected in the presence of framing effects on the
audience, even though these effects were tested after Albernameg had stopped airing.
This shows that the program’s influence on its audience is long run and suggests that
some kind of learning has taken place. In this sense, the show has been an eyeopener when it comes to viewers’ consumption of traditional media forms, acting as a
media literacy platform and involving the audience in evaluating news, rather than
taking it at face value, without second-guessing or analyzing it. Satire’s
entertainment quality also engages politically uninterested viewers and could play a
role in increasing political awareness, especially among young adults, with laughter
and learning occurring simultaneously without viewers having to actively seek
political information. Taking all these points into consideration, audience demand for
political satire is expected to boost more production of programs within this genre.
This is already starting to appear in Egyptian TV presenter, Akram Hosni’s, satirical
program “As’ad Allaho Masa’akom” (Have a Good Evening), which is rapidly
gaining popularity.
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LIMITATIONS	
  OF	
  THE	
  STUDY
•

A non-probability purposive sample was used to collect the data, so the results
cannot be generalized beyond the sample. The choice of this non-probability
sample type was due to the difficulties of obtaining a probability sample in
Egypt, more specifically lack of a list of the population and the lack of a
research culture that would allow the researcher to conduct a cluster sample.

•

The use of coal as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt,
which was used as one of the two frames under analysis, was only discussed
on one episode of Albernameg. Some viewers may not have watched this
episode. The choice of this frame was due to the fact that it was the only
frame on which an expert was interviewed on the show and could thus be
chosen as a frame communicated via a credible source and be deemed a strong
frame.

•

The survey was distributed over a period of two months after Albernameg had
stopped. So, the immediate framing effects may have dissipated and the
effect being tested was long run.

•

Framing effects were examined in relation to perceptions of two issues only,
which are the perception of the AIDS & virus C detection device and
introduction of coal as an alternative source of generating electricity in Egypt.

•

Political knowledge was measured using four questions asking about politics
and current affairs. This may not be an accurate reflective measure of
political knowledge levels among the audience.

•

The study does not prove the presence of framing effects, as survey studies
cannot establish cause and effect relations between variables. The results of
the study only show a correlation between the media frames on Albernameg
and the audience frames regarding perceptions of the two issues under
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investigation. Exposure to the show may not be the main reason behind the
audience’s perceptions; it can be the result of one or more intervening
variables, such as pre-existing beliefs and attitudes or prior knowledge about
the issues.
SUGGESTIONF	
  FOR	
  FUTURE	
  RESEARCH
First, the variables could be studied using a probability sample to be able to
generalize the results.
Second, since this study focused primarily on information and entertainmentmotivated consumption of, or cognitive and affective needs related to, Albernameg,
future research could conduct more in-depth uses and gratifications oriented studies
in order to measure the link between various types of motivations in relation to
political satire consumption. These could include opinion and social motivations, and
tension release needs. According to Lee (2013), political satire was linked to
entertainment and opinion-driven motivations. Those with information-driven
motivations were least motivated to watch them.
Third, testing framing effects in relation to more issues to determine whether the
results are only relevant to the two topics under investigation in this study, or hold
across many issues.
Fourth, since the findings of the study pose political knowledge as a strong
moderator of framing effects, it is recommended to build a more thorough scale for
measuring political knowledge as a variable and how it relates to framing effects.
According to previous studies, varying levels of political knowledge may result in
different effects on viewers (Young, 2004; Young & Tisinger, 2006). Lecheler and
de Vreese’s (2013) study showed that participants with a higher level of political
knowledge exhibited greater accumulation of framing effects and weaker recency
effects when the delay between the first and second exposures was short. Young’s
(2013) study of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report suggests
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that audiences who avoid the shows are low on political knowledge and efficacy, so
they do not have the necessary knowledge to understand the jokes (Young, 2013).
Fifth, discourse analysis of Albernameg throughout all its three seasons to analyze
the discourse on the show. This could help in exploring whether the show really
offers critical criticism of politics and current affairs. Also, it could be crossexamined with the different political regimes that were in place with each set of
episodes to identify differences in manner and tone of presentation in relation to
changing political regimes, if any. This point was debatable among previous studies.
On the one hand, Meddaugh (2010) argues that satire acts as a media literacy
platform, involving its audiences in observing the deficiencies inherent in media and
politics. Anderson & Kincaid’s (2013) study agrees with that direction; their
discourse analysis of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report
showed that the two programs did in fact dissect mainstream news content in a way
that could promote informed discussion and democratic culture. On the other hand,
according to Anderson & Kincaid (2013), satire shows can be dichotomous in nature
with their content reflecting strong hegemonic elements, as well as anti-hegemonic
ones. Fedechko & Vandenberg (2011) argue that Jon Stewart poses as a counterhegemon to the system by merely appearing to challenge it, but in reality he is
offering a façade of democracy, pacifying viewers by laughing at the media and
politics, without any substantial content that could lead to real opposition or action.
Sixth, since the study found that Albernameg audience are also being exposed to
traditional news sources, not just to satire, it is recommended to investigate how
exposure to satire and traditional news sources can affect one another. According to
Young (2013), viewers of The Daily Show and the Colbert Report who report
watching because these shows make the news fun, acknowledge that they are
referring to news they acquired elsewhere, from reading newspapers or watching the
news. Furthermore, Holbert et al’s (2007) experimental analysis of the primacy
effects of watching The Daily Show and CNN Headline News shows that watching
one form prior to the other can lead viewers to think less of the second form they are
exposed to, as a source for political information.
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STUDY	
  RECOMMENDATIONS	
  
•

Encourage production of satire shows with different perspectives, since
political satire has proven to be a strong tool for influencing public opinion, in
order to promote freedom of expression & debate, rather than suppress
dissonant voices.

•

Political candidates can appear on satire shows as part of their election
campaigns.

•

Focus on the use of satire as a tool for increasing political awareness and
media literacy, since it can engage politically uninterested viewers and can
encourage more political participation than traditional news sources, as well
as encourage viewers to analyze rather than take news at face value.
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ﺍاﺳﺘﻤﺎﺭرﺓة ﻣﻮﺍاﻓﻘﺔ ﻣﺴﺒﻘﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺩدﺭرﺍاﺳﺔ ﺑﺤﺜﻴﯿﺔ
ﻋﻨﻮﺍاﻥن ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ :ﺗﻄﻮﺭر ﻭو ﺍاﺛﺎﺭر ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﺍاﻣﺞ ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺎﺳﻴﯿﺔ ﺍاﻟﺴﺎﺧﺮﺓة ﺍاﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﯾﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﻟﺒﺎﺳﻢ ﻳﯾﻮﺳﻒ
ﺍاﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﺍاﻟﺮﺋﻴﯿﺴﻲ :ﺳﻠﻤﻰ ﺛﺮﻭوﺕت ﺍاﺳﻤﺎﻋﻴﯿﻞ  /ﻣﻌﻴﯿﺪﺓة ﺑﺠﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﻣﺼﺮ ﺍاﻟﺪﻭوﻟﻴﯿﺔ
ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻳﯾﺪ ﺍاﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭوﻧﻲsalmatharwat@aucegypt.edu :
ﺍاﻟﻬﮭﺎﺗﻒ01227909606 :
ﺍاﻧﺖ ﻣﺪﻋﻮ ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻰ ﺩدﺭرﺍاﺳﺔ ﺑﺤﺜﻴﯿﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﺍاﻣﺞ ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺎﺳﻴﯿﺔ ﺍاﻟﺴﺎﺧﺮﺓة ﺍاﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﯾﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﻟﺒﺎﺳﻢ
ﻳﯾﻮﺳﻒ.
ﻫﮬﮪھﺪﻑف ﺍاﻟﺪﺭرﺍاﺳﺔ ﻫﮬﮪھﻮ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺍاﺛﺎﺭر ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﺍاﻣﺞ ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺎﺳﻴﯿﺔ ﺍاﻟﺴﺎﺧﺮﺓة ﺍاﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﯾﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﻟﺒﺎﺳﻢ ﻳﯾﻮﺳﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺁآﺭرﺍاء
ﺍاﻟﺠﻤﻬﮭﻮﺭر
ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﺳﺘﻨﺸﺮ ﻓﻰ ﺩدﻭوﺭرﻳﯾﻪﮫ ﻣﺘﺨﺼﺼﻪﮫ ﺃأﻭو ﻣﺆﺗﻤﺮ ﻋﻠﻤﻲ ﺃأﻭو ﺭرﺑﻤﺎ ﻛﻠﻴﯿﻬﮭﻤﺎ.
ﺍاﻟﻤﺪﺓة ﺍاﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻌﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻰ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ  ١۱٠۰ﺩدﻗﺎﺋﻖ .ﺍاﺟﺮﺍاءﺍاﺕت ﺍاﻟﺪﺭرﺍاﺳﺔ ﺗﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻞ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﺍاﺳﺌﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ
ﺍاﺳﺘﻤﺎﺭرﺓة ﺍاﺳﺘﺒﻴﯿﺎﻥن
ﺍاﻟﻤﺨﺎﻁطﺮ ﺍاﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻌﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻰ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﺪﺭرﺍاﺳﺔ  :ﻻ ﻳﯾﻮﺟﺪ
ﺍاﻻﺳﺘﻔﺎﺩدﺓة ﺍاﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻌﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ :ﻻ ﻳﯾﻮﺟﺪ
ﺍاﻟﺴﺮﻳﯾﺔ ﻭوﺍاﺣﺘﺮﺍاﻡم ﺍاﻟﺨﺼﻮﺻﻴﯿﺔ :ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﺘﻰ ﺳﺘﺪﻟﻰ ﺑﻬﮭﺎ ﻓﻰ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﺳﻮﻑف ﺗﻜﻮﻥن ) ﺳﺘﻜﻮﻥن ﻫﮬﮪھﻮﻳﯾﺘﻚ ﻏﻴﯿﺮ
ﻣﺤﺪﺩدﺓة(
ﺃأﻱي ﺃأﺳﺌﻠﺔ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﻬﮭﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﺪﺭرﺍاﺳﺔ ﺃأﻭو ﺣﻘﻮﻕق ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﻴﯿﻦ ﻓﻴﯿﻬﮭﺎ ﺃأﻭوﻋﻨﺪ ﺣﺪﻭوﺙث ﺃأﻯى ﺍاﺻﺎﺑﺎﺕت ﻧﺎﺗﺠﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ
ﻳﯾﺠﺐ ﺍاﻥن ﺗﻮﺟﻪﮫ ﺍاﻟﻰ ﺳﻠﻤﻰ ﺛﺮﻭوﺕت ﺍاﺳﻤﺎﻋﻴﯿﻞ 01227909606
ﺍاﻥن ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻰ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﺪﺭرﺍاﺳﺔ ﻣﺎﻫﮬﮪھﻰ ﺍاﻻ ﻋﻤﻞ ﺗﻄﻮﻋﻰ ،٬ﺣﻴﯿﺚ ﺃأﻥن ﺍاﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎﻉع ﻋﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻻﻳﯾﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﺃأﻯى ﻋﻘﻮﺑﺎﺕت ﺃأﻭو
ﻓﻘﺪﺍاﻥن ﺃأﻯى ﻣﺰﺍاﻳﯾﺎ ﺗﺤﻖ ﻟﻚ .ﻭوﻳﯾﻤﻜﻨﻚ ﺃأﻳﯾﻀﺎ ﺍاﻟﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻰ ﺃأﻯى ﻭوﻗﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺩدﻭوﻥن ﻋﻘﻮﺑﺔ ﺃأﻭو ﻓﻘﺪﺍاﻥن ﻟﻬﮭﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﻤﺰﺍاﻳﯾﺎ.
ﺍاﻻﻣﻀﺎء.......................................................... :
ﺍاﺳﻢ ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻙك ................................................... :
ﺍاﻟﺘﺎﺭرﻳﯾﺦ ............../................/......... :
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ﺍاﺳﺘﻤﺎﺭرﺓة ﺍاﺳﺘﺒﻴﯿﺎﻥن
 (١۱ﻫﮬﮪھﻞ ﻛﻨﺖ ﺗﺸﺎﻫﮬﮪھﺪ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ "ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ" ﻟﺒﺎﺳﻢ ﻳﯾﻮﺳﻒ؟
 .١۱ﻧﻌﻢ
 .٢۲ﻻ)ﺷﻜﺮﺍا ﺑﺮﺟﺎء ﻋﺪﻡم ﺍاﺳﺘﻜﻤﺎﻝل ﺍاﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﯿﺎﻥن(
(٢۲
.١۱
.٢۲
.٣۳

ﻛﻢ ﻋﺪﺩد ﺍاﻟﻤﺮﺍاﺕت ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﻛﻨﺖ ﺗﺸﺎﻫﮬﮪھﺪ ﻓﻴﯿﻬﮭﺎ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ "ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ"؟
ﻁطﻮﺍاﻝل ﺍاﻟﻮﻗﺖ )ﻛﻨﺖ ﺃأﺷﺎﻫﮬﮪھﺪ ﺍاﻟﺤﻠﻘﺔ ﻛﻞ ﺃأﺳﺒﻮﻉع(
ﺑﻌﺾ ﺍاﻷﺣﻴﯿﺎﻥن )ﺣﻠﻘﺔ ﺃأﻭو ﺍاﺛﻨﺎﻥن ﻛﻞ ﺷﻬﮭﺮ(
ﻧﺎﺩدﺭرﺍا )ﺃأﺷﺎﻫﮬﮪھﺪ ﺣﻠﻘﺔ ﻭوﺍاﺣﺪﺓة ﻛﻞ ﺑﻀﻌﺔ ﺃأﺷﻬﮭﺮ(

(٣۳
.١۱
.٢۲
.٣۳
.٤
.٥
.٦

ﻟﻤﺎﺫذﺍا ﻛﻨﺖ ﺗﺸﺎﻫﮬﮪھﺪ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ "ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ"؟ ﻳﯾﻤﻜﻨﻚ ﺍاﺧﺘﻴﯿﺎﺭر ﺃأﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺍاﺟﺎﺑﺔ.
ﻟﻠﺘﺮﻓﻴﯿﻪﮫ ﻭو ﺍاﻟﺘﺴﻠﻴﯿﺔ
ﻟﻤﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺍاﻷﺧﺒﺎﺭر
ﻷﻧﻪﮫ ﻳﯾﻌﺮﺽض ﺍاﻷﺧﺒﺎﺭر ﺑﻄﺮﻳﯾﻘﺔ ﺟﺬﺍاﺑﺔ ﻭو ﻛﻮﻣﻴﯿﺪﻳﯾﺔ
ﻷﻧﻪﮫ ﺻﺎﺩدﻕق ﻭو ﺣﻴﯿﺎﺩدﻱي
ﻟﻌﺮﺿﻪﮫ ﺍاﻟﺨﺒﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﺤﻮ ﺃأﻗﻞ ﺗﻌﻘﻴﯿﺪﺍا ﻳﯾﺴﻬﮭﻞ ﻓﻬﮭﻤﻪﮫ
ﺃأﺧﺮﻯى .ﺗﺬﻛﺮ ....................

(٤
.١۱
.٢۲
.٣۳

ﻣﺎ ﻣﻮﻗﻔﻚ ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻳﯾﻘﺎﻑف ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ "ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ" ﻟﺒﺎﺳﻢ ﻳﯾﻮﺳﻒ؟
ﻣﻊ ﺍاﻳﯾﻘﺎﻑف ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ
ﻣﺤﺎﻳﯾﺪ
ﺿﺪ ﺍاﻳﯾﻘﺎﻑف ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ

 (٥ﺃأﻱي ﻭوﺳﻴﯿﻠﺔ ﺗﺘﺒﻊ ﻟﻤﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺍاﻷﺧﺒﺎﺭر؟ ﻳﯾﻤﻜﻨﻚ ﺍاﺧﺘﻴﯿﺎﺭر ﺃأﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺍاﺟﺎﺑﺔ.
 .١۱ﺍاﻻﺫذﺍاﻋﺔ ﺍاﻟﺼﻮﺗﻴﯿﺔ
 .٢۲ﺍاﻟﺠﺮﺍاﺋﺪ ﺍاﻟﻤﻄﺒﻮﻋﺔ
 .٣۳ﺍاﻟﺠﺮﺍاﺋﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍاﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ
 .٤ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﺍاﻣﺞ ﺍاﻟﺤﻮﺍاﺭرﻳﯾﺔ ﺍاﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﯾﺔ
 .٥ﺍاﻟﻘﻨﻮﺍاﺕت ﺍاﻻﺧﺒﺎﺭرﻳﯾﺔ ﺍاﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﯿﺔ )ﻣﺜﻞ ﺍاﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﯿﺔ ،٬ﺃأﻭو ﺍاﻟﺠﺰﻳﯾﺮﺓة ،٬ﺃأﻭو ﺑﻲ ﺑﻲ ﺳﻲ ﺍاﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﯿﺔ(
 .٦ﺍاﻟﻘﻨﻮﺍاﺕت ﺍاﻻﺧﺒﺎﺭرﻳﯾﺔ ﺍاﻷﺟﻨﺒﻴﯿﺔ )ﻣﺜﻞ ﺑﻲ ﺑﻲ ﺳﻲ ،٬ﺃأﻭو ﺳﻲ ﺃأﻥن ﺃأﻥن(
 .٧۷ﻣﻮﺍاﻗﻊ ﺍاﻟﺘﻮﺍاﺻﻞ ﺍاﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ )ﻣﺜﻞ ﻓﻴﯿﺴﺒﻮﻙك ﻭو ﺗﻮﻳﯾﺘﺮ(
 .٨۸ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﺍاﻣﺞ ﺍاﻟﺴﺎﺧﺮﺓة )ﻣﺜﻞ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ "ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ"(
 .٩۹ﻻ ﺷﻲء ﻣﻤﺎ ﺳﺒﻖ ﺫذﻛﺮﻩه .ﺃأﻧﺎ ﻻ ﺃأﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺍاﻷﺧﺒﺎﺭر.
 .١۱٠۰ﺃأﺧﺮﻯى .ﺗﺬﻛﺮ ....................
(٦
.١۱
.٢۲
.٣۳

ﻣﺎ ﻣﺪﻯى ﺍاﻫﮬﮪھﺘﻤﺎﻣﻚ ﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﯾﺠﺮﻱي ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺎﺳﺔ ﻭو ﺍاﻟﺸﺌﻮﻥن ﺍاﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ؟
ﺷﺪﻳﯾﺪ ﺍاﻻﻫﮬﮪھﺘﻤﺎﻡم
ﻣﻬﮭﺘﻢ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺍاﻟﺸﻲء
ﻏﻴﯿﺮ ﻣﻬﮭﺘﻢ

(٧۷
.١۱
.٢۲
.٣۳

ﻣﺎ ﻣﺪﻯى ﻣﺘﺎﺑﻌﺘﻚ ﻟﻤﺎ ﻳﯾﺠﺮﻱي ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺎﺳﺔ ﻭو ﺍاﻟﺸﺌﻮﻥن ﺍاﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ؟
ﺷﺪﻳﯾﺪ ﺍاﻟﻤﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ
ﺃأﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺍاﻟﺸﻲء
ﻻ ﺃأﺗﺎﺑﻊ
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ﻓﻴﯿﻤﺎ ﻳﯾﻠﻲ ﻋﺪﺩد ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﻌﺒﺎﺭرﺍاﺕت ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺤﺪﺩد ﺭرﺃأﻳﯾﻚ ﻭوﺍاﺗﺠﺎﻫﮬﮪھﺎﺗﻚ .ﻣﻦ ﻓﻀﻠﻚ ،٬ﺍاﺧﺘﺮ ﺍاﻹﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﺗُﻤﺜﻞ ﺭرﺃأﻳﯾﻚ.
ﺃأﺭرﻓﺾ ﺃأﺭرﻓﺾ ﻣﺤﺎﻳﯾﺪ ﻣﻮﺍاﻓﻖ ﻣﻮﺍاﻓﻖ
ﺍاﻟﺠﻤﻠﺔ
ﺑﺸﺪﺓة
ﺑﺸﺪﺓة
ﺃأﻋﺘﺒﺮ ﻧﻔﺴﻲ ﻣﺆﻫﮬﮪھﻞ ﺟﻴﯿﺪﺍا ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻟﺤﻴﯿﺎﺓة ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺎﺳﻴﯿﺔ
٨۸
ﺃأﻋﺘﻘﺪ ﺃأﻥن ﻋﻨﺪﻱي ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺳﻴﯿﺎﺳﻴﯿﺔ ﺃأﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻘﺎﺭرﻧﺔ ﺑﻤﻌﻈﻢ
٩۹
ﺍاﻟﻨﺎﺱس
 ١۱٠۰ﺃأﺷﻌﺮ ﺃأﻧﻨﻲ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺩدﺭرﺟﺔ ﻋﺎﻟﻴﯿﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﻔﻬﮭﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎﺕت
ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺎﺳﻴﯿﺔ ﺍاﻟﻬﮭﺎﻣﺔ ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻮﺍاﺟﻪﮫ ﺍاﻟﺒﻼﺩد
 ١۱١۱ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺍاﻷﺣﻴﯿﺎﻥن ﺗﺒﺪﻭو ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺎﺳﺔ ﻣﻌﻘﺪﺓة ﻟﺪﺭرﺟﺔ ﺃأﻥن
ﺷﺨﺺ ﻣﺜﻠﻲ ﻻ ﻳﯾﺴﺘﻄﻴﯿﻊ ﻓﻬﮭﻢ ﻣﺎ ﺍاﻟﺬﻱي ﻳﯾﺤﺪﺙث
 ١۱٢۲ﺍاﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻮﻥن ﺍاﻟﻤﻨﺘﺨﺒﻮﻥن ﻻ ﻳﯾﻮﻓﻮﻥن ﺑﻮﻋﻮﺩدﻫﮬﮪھﻢ ﺍاﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﯿﻴﯿﺔ
ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﻈﻢ ﺍاﻷﺣﻴﯿﺎﻥن
 ١۱٣۳ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺎﺳﻴﯿﻮﻥن ﻳﯾﻘﻮﻟﻮﻥن ﺃأﻱي ﺷﻲء ﻟﻴﯿﺘﻢ ﺍاﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻬﮭﻢ
 ١۱٤ﺍاﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﺗﻬﮭﺪﺭر ﺍاﻟﻜﺜﻴﯿﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺃأﻣﻮﺍاﻝل ﺩدﺍاﻓﻌﻲ ﺍاﻟﻀﺮﺍاﺋﺐ
 ١۱٥ﺃأﻋﺘﺒﺮ ﺟﻬﮭﺎﺯز ﺍاﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ ﻓﻴﯿﺮﻭوﺱس ﺳﻲ ﻭوﺍاﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺃأﻫﮬﮪھﻢ
ﺍاﻻﺧﺘﺮﺍاﻋﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﯾﺔ ﺇإﻟﻰ ﻳﯾﻮﻣﻨﺎ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا
 ١۱٦ﺟﻬﮭﺎﺯز ﺍاﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ ﻓﻴﯿﺮﻭوﺱس ﺳﻲ ﻳﯾﺠﺪﺩد ﺍاﻷﻣﻞ ﻟﻠﻜﺜﻴﯿﺮ ﻣﻦ
ﺍاﻟﻤﺮﺿﻰ
 ١۱٧۷ﺟﻬﮭﺎﺯز ﺍاﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ ﻓﻴﯿﺮﻭوﺱس ﺳﻲ ﻻ ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﻟﻪﮫ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺐ
 ١۱٨۸ﺃأﻋﺘﺒﺮ ﺍاﺳﺘﺨﺪﺍاﻡم ﺍاﻟﻔﺤﻢ ﻁطﺮﻳﯾﻘﺔ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﺔ ﻟﺤﻞ ﺃأﺯزﻣﺔ ﺍاﻟﻜﻬﮭﺮﺑﺎء
 ١۱٩۹ﺃأﺅؤﻳﯾﺪ ﺇإﺩدﺧﺎﻝل ﻓﻜﺮﺓة ﺍاﺳﺘﺨﺪﺍاﻡم ﺍاﻟﻔﺤﻢ ﻟﺘﻮﻟﻴﯿﺪ ﺍاﻟﻜﻬﮭﺮﺑﺎء ﻓﻲ
ﻣﺼﺮ
 ٢۲٠۰ﺍاﺳﺘﺨﺪﺍاﻡم ﺍاﻟﻔﺤﻢ ﻟﺘﻮﻟﻴﯿﺪ ﺍاﻟﻜﻬﮭﺮﺑﺎء ﺳﻴﯿﺰﻳﯾﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺸﺎﻛﻠﻨﺎ
ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﺍاﻟﺘﻠﻮﺙث ﺍاﻟﺬﻱي ﺳﻴﯿﻨﺘﺞ ﻋﻨﻪﮫ
 ٢۲١۱ﺃأﻧﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺩدﻋﻮﺓة ﺇإﻳﯾﻘﺎﻑف ﺍاﻟﻔﺤﻢ
 ٢۲٢۲ﺑﺎﺳﻢ ﻳﯾﻮﺳﻒ ﻳﯾﻌﺮﺽض ﻣﻘﺎﻁطﻊ ﻓﻴﯿﺪﻳﯾﻮﻫﮬﮪھﺎﺕت ﺣﻘﻴﯿﻘﻴﯿﺔ ﺩدﻭوﻥن ﺃأﻱي
ﺗﻼﻋﺐ
 ٢۲٣۳ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ "ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ" ﻟﻪﮫ ﺍاﻧﺤﻴﯿﺎﺯزﺍاﺕت ﺳﻴﯿﺎﺳﻴﯿﺔ
 ٢۲٤ﺃأﻋﺘﺒﺮ ﺑﺎﺳﻢ ﻳﯾﻮﺳﻒ ﻏﻴﯿﺮ ﻣﻮﺛﻮﻕق ﻓﻴﯿﻪﮫ ﺑﻌﺪﻣﺎ ﻧﻘﻞ ﻣﻘﺎﻝل
ﻛﺎﺗﺐ ﺁآﺧﺮ ﺑﺪﻭوﻥن ﺣﻖ
 ٢۲٥ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ "ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ"ﻣﺤﺎﻳﯾﺪ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻐﻄﻴﯿﺘﻪﮫ ﻟﻠﺸﺌﻮﻥن ﺍاﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ
 ٢۲٦ﺷﺠﺎﻋﺔ ﺑﺎﺳﻢ ﻳﯾﻮﺳﻒ ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻻﻋﺘﺬﺍاﺭر ﺑﻌﺪﻣﺎ ﻧﻘﻞ ﻣﻘﺎﻝل
ﻛﺎﺗﺐ ﺁآﺧﺮ ﺗﺠﻌﻠﻪﮫ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﺛﻘﺔ
 ٢۲٧۷ﺃأﻋﺘﺒﺮ ﺑﺎﺳﻢ ﻳﯾﻮﺳﻒ ﻣﺼﺪﺭر ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕت ﻣﻮﺛﻮﻕق ﻣﻨﻪﮫ
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 (٢۲٨۸ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﺬﻱي ﺗﻢ ﺗﻜﻠﻴﯿﻔﻪﮫ ﺑﺘﻮﻟﻲ ﻣﻨﺼﺐ ﺭرﺋﻴﯿﺲ ﺍاﻟﺠﻤﻬﮭﻮﺭرﻳﯾﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻣﺮﺳﻲ؟
 .١۱ﺇإﺑﺮﺍاﻫﮬﮪھﻴﯿﻢ ﻣﺤﻠﺐ
 .٢۲ﻋﺪﻟﻲ ﻣﻨﺼﻮﺭر
 .٣۳ﻋﺼﺎﻡم ﺷﺮﻑف
 .٤ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺣﺴﻴﯿﻦ ﻁطﻨﻄﺎﻭوﻱي
 .٥ﻻ ﺃأﻋﻠﻢ
 (٢۲٩۹ﻣﺎ ﻫﮬﮪھﻲ ﺟﻨﺴﻴﯿﺔ ﺍاﻟﻄﺎﺋﺮﺓة ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﻓﻘﺪﺕت ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎﺭرﺱس ٢۲٠۰١۱٤؟
 .١۱ﺳﻨﻐﺎﻓﻮﺭرﻳﯾﺔ
 .٢۲ﻓﻴﯿﻴﯿﺘﻨﺎﻣﻴﯿﺔ
 .٣۳ﻣﺎﻟﻴﯿﺰﻳﯾﺔ
 .٤ﺍاﻧﺪﻭوﻧﻴﯿﺴﻴﯿﺔ
 .٥ﻻ ﺃأﻋﻠﻢ
 (٣۳٠۰ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﺬﻱي ﻓﺎﺯز ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﻴﯿﺔ ﺍاﻷﺧﻴﯿﺮﺓة ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻟﺠﺰﺍاﺋﺮ؟
 .١۱ﻣﻨﺼﻒ ﺍاﻟﻤﺮﺯزﻭوﻗﻲ
 .٢۲ﻋﺒﺪ ﺍاﻟﻌﺰﻳﯾﺰ ﺑﻮﺗﻔﻠﻴﯿﻘﺔ
 .٣۳ﻣﺤﻤﻮﺩد ﺃأﺣﻤﺪﻱي ﻧﺠﺎﺩد
 .٤ﻋﻤﺮ ﺍاﻟﺒﺸﻴﯿﺮ
 .٥ﻻ ﺃأﻋﻠﻢ
 (٣۳١۱ﻣﺎ ﻫﮬﮪھﻲ ﺍاﻟﻤﺪﻳﯾﻨﺔ ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻮﺿﻌﺎ ﻟﻠﻨﺰﺍاﻉع ﺑﻴﯿﻦ ﺭرﻭوﺳﻴﯿﺎ ﻭو ﺃأﻭوﻛﺮﺍاﻧﻴﯿﺎ؟
 .١۱ﺍاﻟﻘﺮﻡم
 .٢۲ﻣﻮﺳﻜﻮ
 .٣۳ﺑﻮﺧﺎﺭرﺳﺖ
 .٤ﻣﻴﯿﻨﺴﻚ
 .٥ﻻ ﺃأﻋﻠﻢ
	
  ﺑﺮﺟﺎء ﻣﻞء ﺍاﻟﺒﻴﯿﺎﻧﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﯿﺔ:
 (٣۳٢۲ﺍاﻟﺴﻦ:
 .١۱ﺃأﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ ١۱٨۸
 .٢۲ﻣﻦ  ١۱٨۸ﺇإﻟﻰ ٢۲٥
 .٣۳ﺃأﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ  ٢۲٥ﺇإﻟﻰ ٣۳٥
 .٤ﺃأﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ  ٣۳٥ﺇإﻟﻰ ٤٥
 .٥ﺃأﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ  ٤٥ﺇإﻟﻰ ٥٥
 .٦ﺃأﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ٥٥
 (٣۳٣۳ﺍاﻟﻨﻮﻉع:
 .١۱ﺫذﻛﺮ
 .٢۲ﺃأﻧﺜﻰ
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 (٣۳٤ﺍاﻟﻤﺴﺘﻮﻯى ﺍاﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﯿﻤﻲ:
 .١۱ﺃأﻣﻲ
 .٢۲ﺷﻬﮭﺎﺩدﺓة ﻣﺤﻮ ﺃأﻣﻴﯿﺔ
 .٣۳ﺍاﺑﺘﺪﺍاﺋﻴﯿﺔ
 .٤ﺍاﻋﺪﺍاﺩدﻳﯾﺔ
 .٥ﺛﺎﻧﻮﻳﯾﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﺃأﻭو ﻣﺎ ﻳﯾﻌﺎﺩدﻟﻬﮭﺎ
 .٦ﺷﻬﮭﺎﺩدﺓة ﺟﺎﻣﻌﻴﯿﺔ
 .٧۷ﻣﺎﺟﺴﺘﻴﯿﺮ
 .٨۸ﺩدﻛﺘﻮﺭرﺍاﺓة
 .٩۹ﺃأﺧﺮﻯى .ﺗﺬﻛﺮ ...................
 (٣۳٥ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻂ ﺍاﻟﺪﺧﻞ ﺍاﻟﺸﻬﮭﺮﻱي ﻟﻸﺳﺮﺓة:
 .١۱ﺃأﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ ١۱٠۰٠۰٠۰
 .٢۲ﻣﻦ  ١۱٠۰٠۰٠۰ـ ٢۲٠۰٠۰٠۰
 .٣۳ﺃأﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ  ٢۲٠۰٠۰٠۰ـ ٥٠۰٠۰٠۰
 .٤ﺃأﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ٥٠۰٠۰٠۰
 (٣۳٦ﺍاﻟﻮﻅظﻴﯿﻔﺔ:
 .١۱ﻁطﺎﻟﺐ
 .٢۲ﻻ ﺃأﻋﻤﻞ
 .٣۳ﺃأﻋﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻄﺎﻉع ﺍاﻟﺨﺎﺹص
 .٤ﺃأﻋﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻄﺎﻉع ﺍاﻟﻌﺎﻡم
 .٥ﻣﺘﻘﺎﻋﺪ
 .٦ﺃأﺧﺮﻯى .ﺗﺬﻛﺮ ....................
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Questionnaire
1) Did you watch Bassem Youssef’s Al Bernameg?
1. Yes
2. No (Thank you. Please do not answer the rest of the questions)
2)
1.
2.
3.

How often did you watch Al Bernameg?
All the time (I used to watch the episode every week)
Occasionally (one or two episodes every month)
Rarely (one episode every few months)

3)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Why did you watch Al Bernameg? You can choose more than one answer.
It’s funny and entertaining
To learn the news
It presents the news in an interesting and funny way
It’s unbiased and truthful
It simplifies the news and makes it easier to understand
Other. Please specify ………

4)
1.
2.
3.

What do you think about the decision to stop Bassem Youssef’s Al Bernameg?
With the decision
Neutral
Against the decision

5)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Where do you get the news? You can choose more than one answer.
Radio stations
Print Newspapers
Online newspapers
Egyptian TV talk shows
Arabic news channels (such as Al Arabiya, BBC Arabic or Al Jazeera)
Foreign news channels (such as BBC and CNN)
Social media (such as Facebook and Twitter)
Satire shows (such as Al Bernameg)
None of the above. I don’t follow the news.
Other. Please specify ………

6) Generally speaking, how interested are you in what is going on with politics
and public affairs?
1. Extremely
2. Somewhat
3. Not at all
7) Generally speaking, how often do you pay attention to information about
politics and public affairs?
1. Very often
2. Sometimes
3. Never
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Please select one choice for each statement according to your personal view
Statement

Strongly
disagree

8) I consider myself to be well qualified
to participate in politics.
9) I think that I am better informed about
politics than most people.
10) I feel that I have a pretty good
understanding of the important political
issues facing our country.
11) Sometimes politics seems so
complicated that a person like me cannot
really understand what is going on.
12) Elected officials almost never keep
campaign promises.
13) Politicians will say almost anything
to get elected.
14) The government wastes a lot of the
taxpayer’s money.
15) The virus C detection device is one of
the most important Egyptian inventions
to date.
16) The virus C detection device gives
new hope for many patients.
17) The virus C detection device has
nothing to do with science.
18) I consider coal introduction as an
alternative source of generating
electricity an effective way to solve the
electricity problem.
19) I support the idea of using coal to
generate electricity in Egypt.
20) Using coal to generate electricity will
add to our problems due to the pollution
it will result in.
21) I support the call to stop using coal.
22) Bassem Youssef shows truthful
videos without manipulation.
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Disagree Neutral

Agree Strongly
Agree

23) Al Bernameg has political
inclinations.
24) After Bassem Youssef’s plagiarism
incident, I see him as untrustworthy.
25) Al Bernameg is objective in its
coverage of public affairs.
26) Youssef’s courage in apologizing
after his plagiarism incident makes him
credible.
27) I consider Bassem Youssef a credible
source of information.
28) Who was appointed as interim Egyptian president after Morsi?
1. Ibrahim Mahlab
2. Adly Mansour
3. Essam Sharaf
4. Mohamed Hussein Tantawi
5. I don’t know
29) What is the nationality of the airline whose plane went missing last March?
1. Singaporean
2. Vietnamese
3. Malaysian
4. Indonesian
5. I don’t know
30) Who won the latest Algerian presidential elections?
1. Moncef Marzouki
2. Abdel Aziz Bouteflika
3. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
4. Omar Al Bashir
5. I don’t know
31) Which city were Russia and Ukraine fighting over?
1. Crimea
2. Moscow
3. Bucharest
4. Minsk
5. I don’t know
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32) Age:
1. Less than 18
2. From 18 to 25
3. More than 25 to 35
4. More than 35 to 45
5. More than 45 to 55
6. More than 55
33) Gender:
1. Male
2. Female
34) Educational level:
1. Illiterate
2. Certificate for illiteracy
3. Primary
4. Preparatory
5. Secondary degree or its equivalent
6. University degree
7. Master’s degree
8. Doctorate (Ph.D.)
9. Other. Please specify ………
35) Average monthly income of the family
1. Less than 1000
2. From 1000 to 2000
3. More than 2000 to 5000
4. More than 5000
36) Occupation
1. Student
2. Unemployed
3. Private sector
4. Public sector
5. Retiree
6. Other. Please specify ………
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